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In 1863, Congress placed the first statutory limit on the
amount of money that any one person, company or firm could borrow
from a national bank.' Although no enduring evidence has survived
which might indicate Congress' intent in enacting the original
statute, its progeny, 12 U.S.C. S 84, can be said to express two
objectives. First, by limiting the amount of money a single
individual can borrow, Congress intends to increase availability of
banking services to the public. Congress apparently rationalizes
that national banks are chartered for the good of the general
populace, not a chosen few. Second, by encouraging national banks
to make loans to *a broad array of individuals and entities, the
significance of each loan to the bank's financial health is
reduced. Thus, diversification of bank loan portfolios serves the
interests of safety and soundness of each institution and the
banking industry.2
1. Section 47 of the statute, commonly referred to as the currency Act (12
Stat. 665, et seq) provided as follows:
And be it further enacted, That the total liabilities of
any person, or of any company or firm, (including in the
liabilities of a company or firm the liabilities of the
several members thereof) to any association, including
liabilities as acceptor of bona fide bills of exchange,
payable out of the state where the association is
located, shall at no time exceed one third; exclusive of
liabilities as acceptor, one fifth; and exclusive of
liabilities on such bills of exchange, one tenth part of
the amount of the capital stock of such association
actually paid in.
Currency Act, S 47, 12 Stat. 665, et seq. (1863)(Current version at 12 USC 5 84
(1989)).
2. Both of these concepts were clearly articulated by one of the architects
of the present statute, Representative McFadden, who stated:
[T]his is the most important section of the National
Bank Act. It regulates the amount that a national bank
may lend to one individual, firm, or corporation. The
theory of this section is that the funds of a national
bank should be loaned for the use and benefit of the
business men of the community who furnish the deposits
out of which such loans are made. The section is
intended to prevent one individual, or a relatively
small group, from borrowing an unduly large amount of
the banks deposits for the use of the particular
business enterprises in which they are engaged. It is
intended to safeguard the bank's depositors by spreading
the loans among a relatively large number of persons
engaged in different lines of business.
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One of the notable achievements of Congress's initial foray
into the field of lending limits was the adoption of what has come
to be known as a rule of attribution. Attribution requires that a
loan which is made to an individual or entity may, under certain
circumstances, also be considered as a loan to a third party which
is separate and legally distinct from the recipient of the actual
funds. Thus, both direct and attributable lendings must be
considered for lending limit purposes. Under the original statute,
for example, when a national bank considered lending to a company
or firm, any outstanding loans to the entity's various individual
members would be aggregated with direct loans outstanding to the
company or firm in order to determine whether the intended
transaction would violate the bank's lending limit.' This early
and, admittedly, imprecise attribution rule prevented circumvention
of lending restrictions through the creation of corporate shells or
other artificial identities. The attribution requirements of the
original statute functioned much like the modern statute by
preventing concentration of the bank's resources among a small
cadre of borrowers, and by spreading risk.
Over the last 125 years, the lending limit statute of 1863 has
been amended extensively.4 Regulations promulgated under a broad
68 cong. Rec. B5817 (1927) (Statement of McFadden, Chairman of the House Banking
committee).
Representative McFadden's statement of purpose has been adopted by the occ
in both its regulations and its rulings. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. 5 32.1(b); Letter
of Byrd, Assistant Director, Legal Advisory services Division, No. 184, [1978-
1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85,265 (April 2, 1981); Letter
of Oda, senior Attorney, Legal Advisory Services Division, No. 292, (1984-1987
Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85,462 (June 20, 1984).
This rationale has also been articulated by the courts. see, e.g.,
Corsicana National Bank of Corsicana v. Johnson, 251 U.S. 68, 83 (1919) (The
statutory limit is a special safeguard designed by Congress for the very purpose
among others of preventing undue reliance upon the financial standing of
borrowers); valente v. Dennis, 437 F. Supp. 783, 786 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (citing
OHare v. Second National Bank, 77 Pa. 96, 102-103 (1874))(regulations were
designed to prevent banks from lending too much of their money to one person).
3. See supra, note 1.
4. The statutory history of the original statute, which was derived from
Act June 3, 1864, c.106, S 29, 13 Stat. 108 is designated the National Bank Act
by 12 U.S.C. 5 38, is summarized as follows:
R.S. S 5200; June 22, 1906, c. 3516, 34 Stat. 451; Sept 24, 1918, c. 176, S 6,
40 Stat. 967; Oct. 22, 1919, c. 79, S 1, 41 stat. 269; Feb. 25, 1927, c. 191,
S 10, 44 Stat. 1229; .May 20, 1933, c. 35, S 1, 48 Stat. 73; June 16, 1933, c. 89,
5 26(a), 48 Stat. 191; Aug. 23, 1935, c. 614, Title III, 5 321(b), 49 Stat. 713;
June 11, 1942, c. 404, S 8, 56 Stat. 356; July 22, 1937, c. 517, 515(a), as added
Aug. 14, 1946, c. 964, 5 5, 60 Stat. 1079, and Aug. 25, 1958, P.L. 85-748, S
1(c), 72 stat. 841; Sept. 9,. 1959, P.L. 86-251, S 3, 73 Stat. 488; Sept. 28,
1962, P.L. 87-723, S 4(c)(4), 76 stat. 672; May 25, 1967, P.L. 90-19, S 27(b),
81 Stat. 29; June 23, 1972, P.L. 92-318, Title I, Part D, 5 133(c)(2), 86 Stat.
269.
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statutory grant of authority, expanded and strengthened' the
attribution rules.' In response, bank directors, officers,
customers and their respective counsel have contrived new artifices
to avoid the reach of the rules. Their principal (and formidable)
adversary in this endeavor is the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency ("OCC"). 6 Expressly empowered in 1918 to promulgate rules
and regulations concerning lending limits," the OCC-is charged
with interpretation and enforcement of 12 U.S.C. § 84. However,
the OCC's daunting regulatory power is not attributable to a rigid
and unyielding statutory mechanism. Rather, the OCC wields control
by way of a complex and comprehensive regulatory framework.
This article examines the provisions of 12 U.S.C. S 84, and
its regulatory counterpart, 12 C.F.R. § 32.1, et seq. Part I
generally describes the statute and its application. Part II
examines current attribution rules, considering OCC regulations and
interpretive rulings, as well as existing case law. Finally, Part
III examines statutory liability of bank personnel who are found to
have violated the provisions of Section 84.
I. THE STATUTE
When analyzing various statutory components of federal bank
regulation, the reader must attend carefully to the virtually
plenary authority assumed by OCC in enlarging the scope of the
statute beyond its language through regulatory enhancement. Such
recognition reveals that the statute's influence cannot be
determined merely by examining its terms. The real meaning and
power of Section 84 is defined by and resides with the OCC. Acting
pursuant to Congress's grant of authority to administer and carry
out the purposes of Section 84, the 0CC has effectively formed and
held the first line of defense for the statute.
The current version of the statute became effective on April
14, 1983 with passage of the Garn-St. Germain Depository
Institutions Act of 1982.' The statute has four major components:
5. See 12 C.F.R. S 32.1 et seq. (1991). These regulations promulgated by
the office of the Comptroller of the currency, serve to further refine the
statute's terms, clarify the circumstances under which the statute's exceptions
will be available and describe the tests that will be employed to determine
whether a loan that is ostensibly made to one individual should be attributed to
the account of another in order to determine lending limit compliance.
6. For a brief, yet interesting commentary on such efforts, see Letter of
Byrd, Assistant Director, Legal Advisory services Division, [1978-1979 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85,011 (Aug. 12, 1977) (In any area where
bankers and bank counsel have shown as much ingenuity as they have in the
application of lending limits, it is impossible to cover all possible fact
situations in generalized interpretive rulings).
7. Act Sept. 24, 1918, c. 176, S6, 40 Stat. 967.
8. Act Oct. 15, 1982, P.L. 97-320, Title IV, Part A, S 401(a), 96 Stat.
1508.
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Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) contain broad prohibitions which,
subject to certain exceptions, create the outer boundaries of
permissible lending. Subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) contain
definitional provisions. Exceptions to the restrictions set forth
in subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) are described by subsections
(c)(1-10). Finally, subsections (d)(1) and (d)(2) empower the OCC
to promulgate rules and regulations concerning implementation and
interpretation of the statute.,
A. Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2); Limitations on Lending
Provisions defining basic lending limits are found at 12
U.S.C. S 84(a)(1) and (a)(2):
(a)(1) The total loans and extensions of
credit by a national banking association to a
person outstanding at one time and not fully
secured, as determined in a manner consistent
with paragraph (2) of this subsection, by
collateral having a market value of at least
equal to the amount of the loan or extension
of credit shall not exceed 15 per centum of
the unimpaired capital and unimpaired surplus
of the association.
(a)(2) The total loans and extensions of
credit by a national banking association to a
person outstanding at one time and fully
secured by readily marketable collateral
having a market value, as determined by
reliable and continuously available price
quotations, at least equal to the amount of
the funds outstanding shall not exceed 10 per
centum of the unimpaired capital and
unimpaired surplus of the association. This
limitation shall be separate from and in
addition to the limitation contained in
paragraph (1) of this subsection.
Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) impose two closely related,
though separate, constraints on bank lending. The first prohibits
loans or extensions of credit by a national bank to a single person
in excess of 15 percent of the bank's unimpaired capital and
unimpaired surplus unless the loans or extensions are fully secured
by readily marketable collateral.' The second limit, separate and
9. 12 C.F.R. S 32.2(c) establishes that the terms unimpaired capital and
unimpaired surplus are equivalent to the terms capital and surplus defined at 12
C.F.R. S 3.100. see, 12 C.F.R. S 32.2(c) (1991).
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distinct from the 15 percent ceiling, caps the aggregate amount
that a national bank can lend to one person on a secured or
unsecured basis. In addition, a national bank may loan an
additional 10 percent of its capital and surplus (in excess of the
15 percent ceiling) to a single person provided the additional loan
is fully secured by readily marketable collateral."0  When
considered together, these two fundamental restrictions generally
permit a national bank to lend up to 15 percent of its capital and
surplus to any single person, whether the loan is secured or
unsecured. Moreover, the bank can make additional loans to the
same person, up to an additional 10 percent of its capital and
surplus, provided the additional loans are fully secured by the
types of readily marketable collateral described by the statute.
The OCC considers readily marketable collateral to include
bullion or financial instruments of a type that are capable of
being sold under ordinary circumstances with reasonable promptness
at a value determined by "quotation based upon actual transactions
on an auction or a similar available daily buy and ask price
market."" Accordingly, stocks, bonds, commercial paper,
negotiable certificates of deposit, and money market mutual fund
12 C.F.R. S 3.100(a) states that capital shall include the amount of common
stock outstanding and unimpaired plus the amount of perpetual preferred stock
outstanding and unimpaired. 12 C.F.R. S 3.100(b) (1991). Similarly, 12 C.F.R.
S 3.100(c) defines surplus as the sum of paragraphs (c)(1), (2), (3) and (4) of
that section which provide:
(1) capital surplus; undivided profits; reserves for contingencies and
other capital reserves (excluding accrued dividends on perpetual and limited life
preferred stock); net worth certificates issued pursuant to 12 U.S.C. 1823(i);
minority interests in consolidated subsidiaries; and allowances for loan and
lease losses; minus intangible assets;
(2) Purchased money servicing rights;
(3) Mandatory convertible debt to the extent of 20% of the sum of
paragraphs (a) and (c)(1) and (2) of this section;
(4) Other mandatory convertible debt, limited life preferred stock and
subordinated notes and debentures to the extent set forth [at 12 C.F.R. S
3.100(f)(2)].
10. Although 12 U.S.C. S 84(a)(2) states that the loan will be in
compliance only if readily marketable collateral is posted with respect to the
amount of the funds outstanding, a careful reading of the statute clearly reveals
that only the additional 10% loan must be secured in the manner specified. The
reader's particular attention is drawn to the language at the conclusion of
Section 84(a)(2) which provides that the limitation in that paragraph is separate
from and in addition to the limitation described in Section 84(a)(1). 12 U.S.C.
S 84(a)(2) (1991). Further, 12 C.F.R. S 32.4(b) clearly establishes that the
collateral requirement only applies with respect to the loan or extension of
credit based upon the Section 84(a) (2) limitation, not upon all outstanding loans
or extensions of credit.
11. 12 C.F.R. S 32.4(c) (1991).
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shares in which a bank may perfect a security interest would be
acceptable collateral.12  In contrast, real estate, accounts
receivable, equipment, art-work, boats, and non-negotiable
securities fail to satisfy the definition.
In an effort to promote ongoing statutory compliance, the OCC
mandates that national banks institute and maintain monitoring
procedures which ensure that. each loan is, at all times,
appropriately collateralized." If collateral value drops to the
extent that it is no longer sufficient to fully secure the portion
of a loan made pursuant to subsection (a)(2), and if the general 15
percent loan limitation of subsection (a)(1) is exceeded, the
errant loan must, within five (5) business days, be brought into
conformance. 14  In practice, this requires the loan's principal
balance to be reduced or an additional security interest in
acceptable collateral to be granted to the lending bank. However,
if during the interim, the bank's capital position improves
sufficiently that the loan could then be made without violating the
above limitations, no further correction would be required.
B. Subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2); Definitions
The definitional provisions of the statute have far-reaching
effects. Through expansive definitions of "person" and "loans or
extensions of credit", Congress demonstrated its intent to regulate
all manner and form of indebtedness owing to a national bank by any
individual or entity.
"Persons]" who are subject to the statute are defined at 12
U.S.C. § 84(b)(2) as follows:
[T]he term "person" shall include an
individual, sole proprietorship, partnership,
joint venture, association, trust, estate,
business trust, corporation, sovereign
government or agency, instrumentality, or
political subdivision thereof, or any similar
entity or organization.
12. Id. Financial instruments which are posted as security pursuant to
this section may be denominated in foreign currencies as long as they are freely
convertible to U.s. Dollars. If the collateral is so denominated and payable in
currency other than that of the loan or the extension of credit that it secures,
the bank must have procedures in place to require that the collateral be revalued
on at least a monthly basis, using appropriate foreign exchange rates, in
addition to being repriced at current market value. 12 C.F.R. S 32.4(e) (1991).
13. 12 C.F.R. S 32.4(d) (1991).
14. 12 C.F.R. S 32.4(f) (1991).
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This definition encompasses virtually any legal entity or
structure. 5 Moreover, the statute's reference to "similar" types
of entities, when coupled with the OCC's interpretative powers,
assures that any form of legal structure will, unless specifically
excepted by the OCC, be subject to the provisions of Section 84.
Loans and extensions of credit are defined at 12 U.S.C. §
84(b)(1):
[T]he term loans and extensions of credit
shall include all direct or indirect advances
of funds to a person made on the basis of any
obligation of that person to repay the funds
or repayable from specific property pledged by
or on behalf of the person and, to the extent
specified by the Comptroller of the Currency,
such terms shall also include any liability of
a national banking association to advance
funds to or on behalf of a person pursuant to
a contractual commitment[.]
Accordingly, a loan or extension of credit can arise whenever
a person is, directly or indirectly, obligated to repay money to a
national bank. In simpler times, such an obligation took the form
of a pre-printed promissory note. However, many modern
transactions have attributes of a loan, but (as discussed below)
may be denominated using other terminology. In determining whether
or not a given transaction constitutes a "loan or extension of
credit" governed by the statute, the principal inquiry is whether
or not funds have been advanced in exchange for an obligation to
repay.
The most notable example of a loan hybrid is the repurchase
agreement. In one form of repurchase agreement, an individual
"sells" certain securities to a lending institution for a
prearranged period of time. At the time of "sale", the individual
contractually binds himself to repurchase the securities at a
specific future time for an amount equal to the original sales
price plus a "service charge" which, by no mere coincidence, equals
the amount of interest which would otherwise have accrued on the
funds advanced. Additionally, the repurchase agreement requires
that the original "seller" repurchase the securities at their sales
price, irrespective of any diminution in their value. This
requirement removes any risk stemming from fluctuations in the
value of the collateral. Accordingly, the only remaining exposure
is the credit risk which is common to all loans.
15. 12 C.F.R. S 32.2)(b) completely incorporates the statutory definition
of persons. Sowever, it also adds not-for-profit corporations to the list of
entities included in the definition. Id.
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Courts examining repurchase agreements in other contexts have
not been disswaded from characterising such transactions as
loans.16  Although the parties may be labeled "buyer" and
"seller", money is advanced in return for a contractual obligation
that the original amount be repaid with the addition of a sum which
represents interest. It is hardly surprising that some repurchase
agreements have been considered to be loans by the OCC for Section
84 purposes.1"
16. See, e.g., In re Braswell Government Securities Corp., 648 F.2d 321,
324 n.5 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding that repurchase agreements are, for securities
purposes, short-term collateralized loans); Union Planters National Bank of
Memphis v. United states, 426 F.2d 115 (6th cir. 1970) (finding that, for
purposes of federal tax consequences, repurchase agreements constitute loans);
American National Bank of Austin v. united States, 421 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1970)
(repurchase agreements are loans,not purchases and sales, for purposes of federal
tax law); SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (characterizing
repurchase agreements in a securities context as short-term collateralized
loans). See also, United States v. Erickson, 601 F.2d 296, 300 n.4 (7th cir.
1979), cert. den'd. 442 U.s. 979 (1979) (repurchase agreements are in substance
a secured loan); Erlich-Bober & Co. v. University of Houston, 49 N.Y. 2d 574,
577, 404 N.E. 2d 726, 728, 427 N.Y.S. 2d 604, 606 (1980) (repurchase agreements
are in essence a loan transaction). But see, Matter of Bevill, Bressler &
schulman Asset Management Corporation, 67 B.R. 557, 597-598 (D.N.J. 1986)
(repurchase agreements are to be construed in accordance with the intent of the
parties and, in the subject case, were determined to be contracts for the
purchase and sale of goods,*not loan agreements); City of Harrisburg v. Bradford
Trust Company, 621 F. supp. 463, 469-470 (M.D. Pa. 1985) (for purposes of the
anti-fraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts, repurchase agreements
are securities); SEC V. Gomez, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 92,013 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (repurchase agreements are securities under the
anti-fraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts); In re Financial
Corp., 1 B.R. 522 (W.D. Mo. 1979), aff'd. sub. nom., Financial Corp. v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 634 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1980) (while a repurchase
agreement may have many attributes of a secured loan, the intention of the
parties to effectuate a security interest is lacking); Gilmore v. State Board of
Administration of Florida, 382 So.2d 861 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1980) (repurchase
agreement is not collateralized loan since the buyer had the right to sell the
original securities at any time after acquiring them without accountability for
the sale proceeds, subject only to an obligation to offer like securities for
repurchase by the original seller under the term specified in the agreement).
17. 12 C.F.R. S 32.103 provides as follows:
section 32.103 Purchase of securities subject to Repurchase Agreement.
(a) The purchase of "Type I Securities," as defined in 12 C.F.R. 1.3(c),
subject to an agreement that the seller will repurchase at the end of a stated
period is not a "loan or extension of credit" for purposes of this part.
(b) The purchase of other types of securities subject to an agreement that
the seller will repurchase at the end of a stated period is regarded as a loan
from the purchasing bank to the seller and not as an obligation of the underlying
obligor of the security.
A "Type I security" means a security which a bank may deal in, underwrite,
purchase and sell for its own account without limitation. These include
obligations of the United States, general obligations of any state or any
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Another transactional structure which is similar to a loan is
a personal property lease. Under a personal property lease, an
individual "rents" a piece of property such as a car, a boat or
computer from a bank. The rent that is paid over the course of the
lease is equivalent to the value of the property plus an additional
amount (which may be labelled in any number of ways) roughly
equivalent to the interest payable for loan financing of the
purchase.
Personal property leases can be either closed or open-ended.
In an open-ended lease, the transaction is structured in such a way
that, at the conclusion of the term, the property: (1) has no
remaining value; (2) must be purchased by the lessee; or (3) has a
remaining book value sufficiently less than its projected market
value to assure that the lessor sustains no loss on disposition of
rental property. Thus, the lessor bears no risk associated with
fluctuation in the value of the collateral. The lessor's sole
risks are those present in any ordinary loan transaction (i.e.
pricing and nonperformance risk).
In contrast to an open-ended lease, a close-ended lease does
not obligate the lessee to purchase the rental property or
otherwise assure its continued value. Accordingly, the lessee is
exposed not only to ordinary credit risks, but also to risks
associated with changes in the value of the security during the
course of the lease.
The OCC originally took the position that personal property
leases did not constitute loans for purposes of Section 84. Former
12 C.F.R. § 7.34000 provided:
A national bank may become the owner or lessor
of personal property acquired upon the
specific request and for the use of a customer
and may incur such additional obligations as
may be incident to becoming an owner and
lessor of such property. Lease transactions
do not result in obligations for the purpose
of 12 U.S.C. S 84. [Emphasis added).
political subdivision thereof and other obligations listed in 7 of 12 U.s.c.
5 24. Examples of type I securities set forth in 1 7 include, but are not
limited to, obligations of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority,
obligations issued under authority of the Federal Farm Loan Act and securities
of the Student Loan Marketing Association among others. See Letter of Byrd,
Assistant Director, Legal Advisory services Division, (1979-1982 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,284 (July 7, 1981).
18. 12 C.F.R. S 7.3400 was substantially revised by 44 Fed. Reg. 22393
(1979).
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In M&M Leasing Corporation v. Seattle-First National Bank,19
several motor vehicle leasing agencies, dissatisfied with the OCC's
position on personal property leases, brought suit to combat the
intrusion of national banks into the leasing business. The
agencies sought a determination that personal property leasing
constituted an ultra vires act for a national bank. The district
court analyzed the distinction between open-end and closed-end
leases and determined that the open-end leases were, in fact,
loans. Accordingly, open-end leases constituted valid activities
on the part of national banks. However, the court reasoned that
close-end leases, because of speculative components concerning the
residual value of the collateral, posed risks which were beyond the
appropriate bounds of the banking business."0  Therefore, banks
could not lawfully engage in the creation or servicing of close-end
leases.
On appeal, the 9th Circuit agreed that the open-end personal
property leases are loans. As such, they can properly be
undertaken by national banks. However, the appellate court
modified the lower court's ruling concerning closed-end leases. It
found that close-end leases are appropriate "when, in the light of
all relevant circumstances, the transactions constitute the loan of
19. M & M Leasing v. Seattle First Na'l Bank, 391 F. Supp. 1290 (W.D.
Wash. 1975), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 563 F.2d 1377 (9th cir. 1977).
20. Id. at 1295. Specifically, the court stated:
in my opinion, the open-end motor vehicle lease, which
is the usual form, is merely a variation in the
traditional manner of extending credit and is the
functional equivalent of a loan of personal security.
specifically, the open-end lease differs only
insignificantly from a conditional sales contract with
a final balloon payment. The lease customer assumes all
of the burdens and risks of ownership of the automobile.
The bank, during the lease term, is repaid the cost of
the vehicle together with the cost of financing the
transaction out of a combination of rentals and
guaranteed residual payment, and sometimes tax benefits
also. The bank is promised a pre-established financial
return, with only the usual risks inherent in any credit
transaction.
The closed-end vehicle lease, on the other hand, is not
functionally equivalent to a loan because the lessee
does not guarantee the residual value of the car. The
risk of downward fluctuation in that value falls on the
bank; this fact sets the closed-end vehicle lease apart
from an ordinary loan. A closed-end lease is equivalent
to a loan only if written for a term which exhausts the
usable life of the leased property so that the bank does
not rely on any residual value in its calculation of its
expected financial return. Closed end vehicle leases do
not meet this criterion. (Emphasis added]. Id.
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money secured by the properties leased.'u21  The "bright line"
traced by the district court was blurred by the appellate court's
"totality of the circumstances" test. Therefore, not all closed-
end leases constituted improper banking activity. Instead, the
appellate court found that a closed-end lease was permissible if
residual value of rental property upon termination of the lease was
not expected to contribute substantially to the bank's recovery of
its advances plus interest.22
In analyzing a personal property lease, it is important to
note that the substance of the transaction warrants the conclusion
that there has been an indirect advance of funds in exchange for a
repayment obligation. This is, of course, the essence of a "loan
or extension of credit" pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 84. The
transaction appears to be no more than a promissory note with a
prearranged stream of payments. Only one feature distinguishes a
personal property lease from most bank lending transactions: in a
loan, a bank would maintain a security interest in the collateral,
while the customer holds title to the property. However, in a
lease, the bank maintains both ownership of the property and the
right to repossess it in the event of a default by the renter.
Despite this distinction, the transaction represents a repayment
obligation for principal and interest. Accordingly, it is
appropriately subject to the statute's limitations.
21. M & M Leasing, 563 F.2d at 1381.
22. Id. The appellate court stated:
Finally, our holding manifestly is not intended to
authorize leases which imposed significant financial
risks on national banks more onerous than those incident
to loans. Therefore, it is necessary that the lessor
bank look primarily to the obligations of the lessee for
the entire return of its advances. It is the lessee's
creditworthiness, not primarily the market value of the
property, to which the bank must look for its return.
No banker, however, ignores the borrowers collateral;
nor must he when the loan is cast in lease form. our
point, put differently, is that a lease, which from its
inception inevitably must be repeated or extended to
enable the bank to recover its advances plus profit, is
not a "loan of money on personal security." such leases
indicate a rental business, not the business of banking.
To engage in the business of renting personal property
would permit the assumption of risks not permitted
national banks. An impermissable assumption of risks is
not Indicated, however, by an open-end lease, in which
the bank's entire advance is guaranteed by the lessee,
or a closed-end lease, in which the residual value of
the leased property at the expiration of the lease
contributes unsubstantially to the bank's recovery of
its advances plus interest. (Emphasis added]. Id. at
1382.
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Another type of transaction closely analogous to a "loan" is
the discounting of commercial paper. When a bank "discounts"
paper, it purchases the paper for less than its face value. The
difference between the face value and the amount actually paid for
the paper is the "discount". This amount is typically thought to
represent prepaid interest and service charges incurred in
connection with the transaction. The seller of the paper can
transfer it to the bank on either a recourse or a non-recourse
basis. If the paper is negotiated on a recourse basis, the seller
must satisfy the paper in the event of default by the drawer. In
such a case, a loan has been made; there has been a transfer of
funds in exchange for a repayment obligation. However, if the
paper is transferred without recourse, whether direct or indirect,
no loan has been made, since the seller has incurred no express or
implied repayment obligation. Instead, the original maker of the
paper becomes the bank's borrower.23
In view of statutory language proscribing "indirect" advances
of funds, bank overdrafts have also been found to constitute
transactions within the purview of 12 U.S.C. § 84.24. This view
holds whether the overdraft is prearranged or not. 25  The OCC
merely focuses on the fact that the money has been exchanged
contemporaneously with the creation of an implied repayment
obligation.
Renewals of existing obligations may also, in certain cases,
constitute loans or extensions of credit. Although renewal of an
existing loan which has become excessive because of a decline in
the bank's capital position does not violate the statute, such a
holding is primarily based upon the rationale that "no new money
23. These conclusions are compelled by the terms of 12 C.F.R. S 32.104
which states:
Where a bank purchases third-party paper subject to an agreement that the
seller will repurchase the paper upon default or at the end of a stated period
after default, the seller's obligation to repurchase is subject to 12 U.S.C. S
84 and is measured by the total unpaid balance of the paper owned by the bank
less any applicable dealer reserves. Where seller's obligation to repurchase is
limited, the seller's total loans or extensions of credit, for the purpose of 12
U.S.C. S 84 are measured by the total amount of paper the seller may ultimately
be obligated to repurchase. Where no more than an agreed percentage of the
purchase price is retained by the bank and credited to the reserve to be held as
a form of collateral security, but the bank has no direct or indirect recourse
to the seller, the loans or extensions of credit do not constitute loans or
extensions of credit to the seller subject to the limitations of S 84.
The reader should note, however, that certain of the exceptions of S 84 may
be relevant to the consideration of this issue. specifically, the reader's
attention is drawn to exceptions 1 and 8 of 12 u.s.c. S 84(c).
24. 12 C.F.R. S 32.105 (1991). See also, Mccormick v. King, 241 F. 737 (9th
cir. 1917), aff'd. 250 u.s. 504 (1919).
25. 12 C.F.R. 5 32.105 (1991).
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leaves the 15ank's vaults.,26 However, if a new loan includes both
principal and interest from discounted prior loans which exceeded
statutory limits, a violation has occurred. In such a case, the
prepaid interest amount is, in effect, being advanced. Whenever
"new money" is advanced by the bank, a new loan occurs. Therefore,
statutory compliance must be examined at that time."
The second way in which a loan or extension of credit can be
created is through a contractual commitment by the bank to advance
funds.28  Such commitments usually occur in one of three ways: (1)
26. Payne v ostrus, 50 F.2d 1039 (8th cir. 1931). Finding a renewal not
to be violative of the statute, the Court wrote:
In the absence of exceptional circumstances and a course
of conduct pointing unavoidably to a deliberate purpose
to evade the law and to extend unwarranted lines of
credit, we do not think the taking of renewal notes
falls within the inhibition of the letter and spirit of
the statute. No new money leaves the bank's vaults ...
It does not appear that the bank was damaged by the
taking of these renewal and interest notes, nor is it
shown that the original notes were collectible or that
the interest could have been paid by the makers.
Furthermore, the best interests of banks often demand
that notes should be renewed, and that, on occasion,
collections should not be pressed. Id. at 1041;
See also, Letter of Byrd, Assistant Director, Legal Advisory Services Division,
[1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,039 (Sept. 30,
1977).
27. Atherton v. Anderson, 86 F.2d 518 (6th cir. 1936) rev'd. on other
grounds sub nom. Anderson v. Atherton, 302 U.S. 643 (1937). In Atherton, the
subject bank advanced interest on a renewal note. The obligation which was the
subject of the renewal note had a prepaid interest component. The renewal note
was in an amount in excess of that permitted by the statute. Finding the loan
excessive, the court held that loans may not become excessive by the mere running
of time and the inclusion of interest with principal is insufficient to
constitute the loan being excessive for no new money leaves the bank's vaults.
However, when interest is incorporated with the original note and.a renewal note
is issued, the total indebtedness of a borrower increases so that the entirely
new loan is in excess of that which the bank is permitted by law to loan to the
borrower. Under such circumstances the new loan violates the statute because new
money does leave the bank's vaults. Id. at 533, 534.
28. 12 C.F.R. S 32.2(d) defines a "contractual commitment to advance funds"
as follows:
(d)(1) . . . an obligation to make payments (directly or
indirectly) to a third party contingent upon default by
the banks customer in the performance of an obligation
under the terms of that customer's contract with the
third party or upon some other stated condition; or
(2) an obligation to guarantee or stand as surety for
the benefit of a third party. . . .; or
(3) a qualifying commitment to lend (as defined at
paragraph (f) of this section). The term includes, but
is not limited to, standby letters of credit (as defined
in paragraph (e) of this section), guarantees, puts or
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by an obligation undertaken by the bank to make payments, directly
or indirectly, to a third party upon the occurrence of a stated
condition or upon default of the bank's customer under the terms of
a contract with that third party; (2) pursuant to a guaranty
obligating given by a bank to act as surety for the benefit of a
third party; and (3) in accordance with the terms and conditions
set forth in a "commitment letter" evidencing the bank's future
obligation to make a loan.
A bank's obligation to make third-party payments typically
arises through the issuance of a standby letter of credit. A
standby letter of credit is defined in 12 C.F.R. S 32.2(e) as
follows:
A "standby letter of credit" is any letter of
credit or similar arrangement, however named
or described, which represents an obligation
to the beneficiary on the part of the issuer
(1) to repay money borrowed by or advanced to
or for the account of the account party, or
(2) to make payment on account of any
indebtedness undertaken by the account party,
or (3) to make payment on account of any
default by the account party in the
performance of an obligation.
Standby letters of credit function as security documents. For
example, a letter of credit may be posted as collateral in
connection with a promissory note. The letter might also be used
to provide indemnity against failure of some future performance.
Real estate developers often post letters of credit with
municipalities or other government agencies in order to provide
irrevocable assurance of their financial ability in connection with
required site improvements.
When a bank issues a standby letter of credit, the bank is at
risk from the time that the letter of credit is issued. The risk
does not abate until the letter either expires or until the
underlying conditions requiring its issuance have been satisfied.
Therefore, the bank incurs a credit risk simply by issuing the
letter of credi:, regardless of whether it is ever called upon by
other similar arrangements.
For the purposes of this part, undisbursed loan funds and loan commitments not
yet drawn upon which are not qualifying commitments to lend, or which are not
otherwise equivalent to a contractual commitment to advance funds as defined are
not considered a contractual commitment to advance funds. This definition also
does not include commercial letters of credit and similar instruments where the
issuing bank expects the beneficiary to draw upon the issuer, which do not
guarantee payment of a money obligation, and which do not provide for payment in
the event of default by the account party.
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the beneficiary to perform according to its terms. Under these
circumstances, the OCC has determined that 12 U.S.C. § 84 must be
applied from the moment that the letter of credit is issued.
Therefore, the issuance of a letter of credit is viewed as the
inception of an extension of credit.29  If the letter is
subsequently extended or renewed, the time of the extension or
renewal may be considered to be the inception of a new extension of
credit.30
Guaranties and other arrangements, whereby a bank agrees to
answer for the debt of another, represent another class of
extensions of credit.31  Much the same as above, the bank
undertakes a future and contingent obligation to advance money for
the benefit of an obligor in exchange for the obligor's promise to
repay. Again, since credit risk is incurred by issuing the future
promise to pay, it is not necessary that repayment actually be
demanded in order for the transaction to be subject to the
limitations of Section 84.32
A binding written commitment to lend is also viewed as a
contractual obligation to advance funds." Although the OCC has
not provided any guidance in this area, the law of contracts would
presumably determine whether or not the commitment is "binding".
In other words, the commitment would have to be supported by
consideration; be sufficiently definite so as to be enforceable;
and all necessary preconditions would have to have been satisfied.
Since a written commitment to lend is necessarily a future
obligation, an interesting question arises as to when lending limit
compliance should be determined: at the time of the issuance of the
commitment or, upon funding? For example, on January 1, 1991,
Bank's capital and surplus is $10,000,000 and its unsecured lending
limit is equal to 15 percent of that amount, or $1,500,000. Later
the same day, Customer, who already owes $1,000,000 in unsecured
loans, obtains a commitment from Bank for additional unsecured
loans in the amount of $500,000. Following issuance of the
commitment, Bank's capital and surplus declines to $9,000,000,
29. 12 C.F.R. 5 32.2(d)(1) (1991).
30. Letter of Corey, Attorney No. 477, (1989-1990 Transfer Binder], Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 83,027 (Jan. 11, 1989). (At the expiration of a standby
letter of credit, the risk is extinguished. Accordingly, renewing the letter
renews the risk and compliance should be examined at that time. A different rule
applies to "evergreen" letters, however. such letters of credit give the
beneficiary the right to call the letter if it is not renewed. Accordingly, the
failure to extend such a letter of credit may actually increase, not decrease,
the risk to the bank. Renewals of "evergreen" letters are not, therefore,
considered new extensions of credit).
31. 12 C.F.R. S 32.2(d)(2) (1991).
32. Id.
33. 12 C.F.R. S 32.2(d)(3) (1991); 12 C.F.R. S 32.2(f) (1991).
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reducing Bank's lending limit to $1,350,000. Can Bank advance
under the commitment letter, or will such a loan result in a
lending limit violation?
The OCC takes the position that a "snapshot" of the Bank's
position on the date of commitment is sufficient to establish
lending limit compliance as long as the commitment and all other
outstanding loans (or commitments) to Customer were within Bank's
lending limit on the date of the subject commitment.34 In such a
case, if a decline in the lending limit occurs, funding of the loan
would not violate Section 84 since the extensions of credit were
legal at the time of execution. Instead, the excessive portion of
the loan would be viewed as "non-conforming".3S If Customer sought
to renew the loan, Bank would be required to utilize its best
efforts to bring the loan back into conformance. This could be
accomplished through, for example, partial repayment or by
obtaining participation of another lending institution.3
On the other hand, if the commitment, combined with Customer's
other loans, exceeded Bank's lending limit at the time the
commitment was issued, the commitment would not be deemed a loan
until funded. Therefore, the legality of the subsequent loan would
be examined at the time of funding."' Accordingly, if Bank's
lending limit had declined, the protective leeway permitted by the
non-conforming rule would be unavailable and the extension of
credit would be deemed unlawful.
This scheme appears to make sense in that it protects
extensions which were proper when committed but does not protect
extensions which were excessive at their inception. However, the
rule appears logically flawed in another context: unless the
commitment provides otherwise, the borrower can demand performance
by the bank, even if regulation prohibits the bank from funding all
or part of the loan. If the bank refuses to perform, it could be
answerable in damages for breaching its contractual commitment to
make the loan.3" The bank could be faced with a choice between
34. 12 C.F.R. S 32.2(f) (1991). If these conditions are satisfied, the
commitment is deemed a qualifying commitment.
35. Department of the Treasury, comptroller of the Currency 56 Fed. Reg.
37272 (Aug. 6, 1991), reprinted at Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1 88,561 (1991).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See, National Farmers Organization, Inc. v. The Kingsley Bank, 731 F.2d
1464 (10th cir. 1984) (Lending limit statutes are designed to proscribe bank, not
borrower, conduct. Accordingly, borrowers, without notice of a lending limit
violation, may enforce their contract.); Bank Itec N.V. V. J. Henry Schroder Bank
& Trust company, 612 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (State and federal courts have
universally applied a single guiding principle: one without knowledge of a
statutory lending limit violation can enforce an obligation which violates that
limit.); See also First American National Bank v. Alcorn, Inc., 361 so. 2d 481
(Miss.- 1978) (Letter of credit beneficiary who was unaware of lending limit
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disbursing the loan in violation of its lending limit, or breaching
its contract with the borrower and incurring damages which may
exceed the amount of the loan.
It would appear more appropriate to determine lending limit
compliance on the date of the comnitment and retain the rule of
non-conformance. The date of commitment is the date on which the
obligation and consequent credit risk are incurred. In this
manner, national banks and their directors could be spared the
choice between honoring a contract and incurring the wrath of the
OCC, or incurring civil liability for breaching the contract.
Their new alternatives would be simple and straightforward; lend or
don't lend based upon present facts, not future projections or
occurrences. Commitments that were lawful when made would not be
affected by a reduction in the bank's lending limit.3"
violation could enforce maker's obligation under the letter of credit.); Bank of
College View v. Nelson, 106 Neb. 129, 183 N.W. 100 (1921) (Innocent borrower can
enforce bank's promise to lend a sum in excess of legal lending limit.); Labor
Discount center, Inc. v. State Bank and Trust company, 526 S.W. 2d 407 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1975) (Absenc knowledge of'a given banks loan limits, a borrower should be
able to hold a bank liable for breach of a contract to make a loan).
39. Recent rule revisions by the OCC have, in the opinion of the author,
exacerbated this situation. Formerly, if a bank's lending limit was $5 million
and the bank had issued a binding written loan commitment in that amount to a
customer, any further loan or extension of credit would have violated the bank's
lending limit. This is because the commitment would be considered a loan or
extension of credit on the date issued since it was within the bank's lending
limit. See Former 12 C.F.R. s32.2(d) as revised by 56 Fed. Reg. 37272 (August
6, 1991), and recodified at 12 C.F.R. SS32.2(d)(3) and 32.2(f). Presently, if
a bank entered into a $456 million commitment with a customer, it would be free
to advance cash to that customer up to its $5 million lending limit. Id. This
result is justified by the fact that the commitment is not considered as an
extension of credit when made. The bank's sole exposure (other than a potential
"safety and soundness" argument) is the possibility of a breach of contract claim
should it be unable to subsequently fund the excessive commitment.
Instead of adopting a conservative approach that measures lending limit
compliance on the date that the binding contract to lend is entered into, the OCC
now allows actual loans to be made up to the amount of the bank's lending limit
whether or not the commitment was within the limitation when entered into. 12
C.F.R. 532.2(f) (1991). In other words, using the above-described example, both
customers would be permitted to go to the bank and obtain loans for up to $5
million even though they already had, respectively, $5 million and $456 million
unadvanced loan commitments outstanding. Id. The OCC does require that the
unfunded loan commitment be disqualified, for Section 84 purposes, for each
dollar actually advanced. Id. Yet, this approach still ignores that fact that
the commitment is a contractual undertaking for breach of which the bank will be
answerable in damages. Given this level of regulatory permissiveness, diligent
bankers would be well advised to insert a precondition into their loan
commitments that relieves them of the obligation to fund if to do so would
violate section 84. Alternatively, bankers who advance funds which, when
combined with outstanding commitments, would exceed section 84 limits should give
serious consideration to obtaining contractual releases of their pre-existing
obligations.
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The word "obligation" within the definition of "loans or
extensions of credit" also has particular significance. An
"obligation" represents a legally enforceable duty. Accordingly,
the discharge of a loan in bankruptcy, or its unenforceability at
law (as, for example, by passage of the applicable statute of
limitations), remove such loans from the reach of the statute.4"
However, a loan which is charged off in whole or in part by the
bank does not necessarily represent an extinguished obligation
since the bank's accounting practice does not make the loan any
less enforceable. Therefore, charged off loan balances may be
fully considered in calculating lending limit compliance.41
C. Subsections (c)(1-10); Statutory Exceptions
Most of the statutes's exceptions are absolute, allowing
unlimited extensions of credit. However, certain of the exceptions
merely create specific lending limits particular to instances where
they are present and distinct from the broad parameters previously
described. Each exception is separately discussed below.
1. Recourse Commercial Paper
12 U.S.C. S 84(c)(1) provides:
Loans or extensions of credit arising from the
discount of commercial paper or business paper
evidencing an obligation to the person
negotiating it with recourse shall not be
subject to any limitation based upon capital
or surplus.
This exception allows for unlimited extensions of credit by a
bank in discounting negotiable paper which has been used to finance
the purchase of commodities which are the subject of certain
domestic or export transactions. The commodities must be either
for resale, fabrication of a product, or any other business purpose
which may reasonably be expected to provide funds for payment of
the paper.42
Generally, such paper must bear the full recourse endorsement
of its owner.43 However, if the notes are generated in connection
with the discounting of paper utilized in an export transaction,
they may be non-recourse or limited recourse (including those
covered by separate agreement for limited recourse) as long as they
are transferred in conjunction with an assignment of appropriate
40. 12 C.F.R. 5 32.106 (1991).
41. Id.
42. 12 C.F.R. S 32.6(a)(2) (1991).
43. Id.
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insurance covering political, credit and transfer risks associated
with the paper.44  In such cases, the insurance is deemed to
represent a satisfactory substitute for the recourse endorsement.4"
The rationale for this exception is that the discounted paper
is created in connection with the sale of a commodity which, in
turn, serves as a source of repayment." For example, the
discounting of agricultural sales paper created in connection with
the sale of farm machinery to farmers is entitled to the exception.
Reasoning that this machinery will be used to produce crops which,
in turn, provide a source of repayment, the OCC stated:
[The exception] is applicable to negotiated
paper, bearing the full recourse endorsement
of an actual owner, given by a farmer in
payment of the purchase price of farm
machinery, the use of which may reasonably be
expected to provide funds for the payment of
the paper upon its maturity. This means that
it must appear reasonable, not only to the
farmer but to the banker or a disinterested
third person, that the machinery will improve
production to the extent that -the machinery
may be said to pay for itself within the term
of the paper.47 [Emphasis added]
The requirement of the OCC that the machinery must pay for
itself during the term of the paper is consistent with extending
exceptions to financing for items which establish their own
repayment source. This exception is founded upon the notion that
the paper is effectively backed by commodities which can be viewed
as a source of repayment. It should be noted that, if the item
purchased with the paper becomes obsolete prior to the generation
of commodities sufficient to pay for its purchase, the underlying
rationale has been defeated and the exception becomes unavailable
for continued use.
The OCC has taken the position that the source-of-repayment
rationale mandates that any default with respect to payment on the
paper, whether of principal or interest, vitiates the justification
for the grant of unlimited credit.4" If such a default occurs,
there must have been an insufficient basis for believing that the
44. Id.
45. Comptroller of the Currency Letter, [1961-1963 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 93,653 (Jan 21, 1963; Comptroller of the Currency Letter,
(1961-1963 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1 93,645 (Dec. 14, 1962).
46. 12 C.F.R. S 32.6(a)(3) (1991).
47. Comptroller of the Currency Letter, [1961-1963 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 93,680 (Feb. 1, 1963).
48. 12 C.F.R. S 32.6(a)(3) (1991).
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commodity financed would generate enough funds to make payments on
the paper. Such a default would not make the subject loan
retroactively violate the statute. However, it would require the
paper to be taken into consideration to determine lending limit
compliance with regard to subsequent renewals, extensions or
additional loans to the same borrower.49
At first, this exception appears to defy both of the statute's
stated intentions. Theoretically, one person could "tap out" an
institution based upon paper generated in connection with a single
line of business. Accordingly, risk diversification and benefit
spreading would be ill-served. However, the mechanics of
discounting warrant a conclusion that, except in the most unusual
cases, many persons in a plethora of business enterprises are
served by this provision with little erosion of the statute's
goals. Sellers of commercial paper are, for their own protection,
prone to risk diversification, as are discounters. Moreover, if it
were shown that the seller of the paper was merely acting as a
"pass-through" agent for a single maker, such a pattern of
transactions would be discovered and the exception disallowed under
the direct benefit and common enterprise tests hereinafter
described.
2. Bankers' Acceptances5"
12 U.S.C. S 84(c)(2) provides:
The purchase of bankers' acceptances of the
kind described in Section 13 of the Federal
Reserve Act [12 U.S.C. SS 82, 342-346, 347c,
372] and issued by other banks shall not be
subject to any limitations based on capital
and surplus.
Purchase of bankers' acceptances of the type described at 12
U.S.C. § 372 and S 3731 is not subject to the lending limitations
of Section 84." These statutes establish separate limitations on
the acceptance of "eligible" drafts by a national bank. Such
limitations are beyond the scope of this article. However, drafts
49. id.
50. A banker's acceptance is nothing more than a time draft that has been
finally accepted by a bank for payment. BLACK's LAW DIcTioNARY 133 (5th ed. 1979).
The act of acceptance is the functional equivalent of a guaranty by the accepting
bank to honor the draft when it is presented. U.C.C. S 3-410 (1989). As such,
the accepting bank has substituted its credit for that of the original maker of
the instrument.
51. 12 U.S.C. S 373 applies to drafts or bills that are drawn by banks in
foreign countries or dependencies of the United states for purposes of dollar
exchanges. An examination of the interfacing between 12 u.s.c. S 84, 12 U.S.c.
S 372 and 12 U.S.C. S 373 is beyond the scope of this Article. Accordingly, the
interaction between 12 U.S.C. S 84 and 12 u.s.c. s 372 alone will be examined.
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which are "ineligible" (i.e. not of the type described at 12 U.S.C.
S 372 and § 373) are subject to lending limits set forth in 12
U.S.C. § 84.
The "eligible drafts" exception to 12 U.S.C. S 84 is based
upon that fact that eligible bankers' acceptances are marketable
securities backed by the credit of issuing financial institutions
which are regulated pursuant to 12 U.S.C. S 372. However, in these
troubled economic times, the rationale underlying this exception
may prove no stronger than the weakest bank permitted to issue
bankers' acceptances. Although the demands of commercial custom
may require this exception, it can no longer be unequivocally
stated that all commercial banks which create bankers' acceptances
represent unquestionable sources for the repayment of the funds
represented by the acceptances.
As previously stated, 12 U.S.C. § 84 and 12 U.S.C. § 372
create different limits with respect to bankers' acceptances,
depending upon the nature of the acceptance, and the identities of
the acceptor and the holder.52  A banker's acceptance is never
simultaneously subject to both sections. Nor is the bank free to
choose which limitation should apply.53
In determining the applicable lending limit, the first inquiry
to be made is whether the acceptance is "eligible" or "ineligible".
This determination is governed by the provisions of 12 U.S.C. § 372
which, in the pertinent part, provides:
Any member bank and any Federal or State
branch or agency of a foreign bank subject to
reserve requirements . . . of the
International Banking Act . ., may accept
drafts or bills of exchange drawn upon it
having not more than six months sight to run,
exclusive of days of grace -
(i) which grow out of transactions involving
the importation or exportation of goods;
(ii) which grow out of transactions involving
the domestic shipment of goods; or
(iii) which are secured at the time of
acceptance by a warehouse receipt or other
such document conveying or securing title
covering readily marketable staples.
52. Letter of Byrd, Assistant Director, Legal Advisory Services Division,
No. 131, [1979-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85,212 (Dec.
17, 1979).
53. Id.
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If a banker's acceptance meets all of the requirements set
forth in 12 U.S.C. § 372, it is considered to be an "eligible"
acceptance. If it does not meet those requirements, it is
"ineligible".
When a bank accepts is an eligible draft, the limitations
contained in 12 U.S.C. S 372 are exclusively applicable. In such
cases, 12 U.S.C. § 84 lending limits are pre-empted. Accordingly,
a national bank may not create eligible acceptances in excess of
its 12 U.S.C. § 372 limit, even though the bank's 12 U.S.C. S 84
limitations would not be met.54
However, if the bank then discounts its own eligible
acceptance a different result occurs. Such transactions are not
subject to 12 U.S.C. § 372. Instead, 12 U.S.C. S 84 represents the
sole applicable lending limit. This is because, after discounting,
the acceptances are considered to be a loan to the bank's
customer.55 The bank has given cash in exchange for the instrument
and a promise to pay if it is subsequently dishonored. If these
acceptances are later resold or further discounted, 12 U.S.C. § 84
will no longer govern. Instead, the amounts must be included in
the bank's 12 U.S.C. S 372 limitation.5"
The purchase of eligible acceptances issued by other banks is
not subject to the provisions of either Section 372 or Section 84.
This is because 12 U.S.C. S 372 only applies to the actual act of
acceptance and 12 U.S.C. § 84(c)(2) specifically exempts the
purchase of eligible bankers' acceptances from the general lending
limitations of that statute.57
Most situations are greatly simplified if an acceptance is
determined to be "ineligible". If so, Section 372 cannot be
applied. Accordingly Section 84 will represent the sole lending
limitation."8
The following example illustrates the application of these
rules. If Customer presents a draft to First Bank for acceptance,
First Bank would initially determine whether or not the draft has
been issued in connection with any types of transactions described
by 12 U.S.C. § 372. If this initial inquiry were answered in the
affirmative, the draft would be considered "eligible" and
limitations set forth in Section 372 should be consulted. If the







act of acceptance would be considered a loan or extension of credit
subject to the lending limits of Section 84.
Assuming First Bank has accepted an "eligible" draft, if
Customer were to ask First Bank to discount that draft, Section 372
would no longer apply. Instead, Section 84 would govern. The
Section 84 exception for bankers' acceptances would be unavailable
since it applies only to acceptances issued by third party banks
other than the discounting institution. However, if Customer were
to take the eligible acceptance to Second Bank for discounting,
Second Bank would not be subject to Section 372, but could benefit
from Section 84 exception. As such, no limitations would apply.
The same result would occur if, subsequently, First Bank were to
discount the eligible acceptance of Second Bank. In such a case,
First bank would no longer consider the acceptance as a loan to
Customer. Instead, the transaction would be subject solely to the
limitations expressed in Section 372.
If the acceptance created by First bank is "ineligible", any
transaction discounting it for Customer's benefit would be viewed
as a loan subject to Section 84. Hence, the above exception would
not be available. Moreover, if First Bank were to discount its own
ineligible acceptance and later discount the ineligible acceptance
to Second bank, Second Bank's discounting would be considered to
represent a loan to First Bank subject to Section 8 4 .s9
Commercial realities lead to the conclusion that the exception
furthers both of Section 84's statutory intentions. Bankers'
acceptances are business instruments created in connection with
many sorts of transactions. It is doubtless that circumstances
could arise which might appear to frustrate the intention of the
statute. However, a more realistic view is that the exception
furthers commerce and trade. Congress could reasonably be believed
to have determined that the goals of risk diversification and
benefit spreading would be fostered by the exception.
3. Loans Secured by Bills of Lading or Warehouse Receipts
Covering Readily Marketable Staples
12 U.S.C. § 84(c)(3) states as follows:
Loans and extensions of credit secured by
bills of lading, warehouse receipts, or
similar documents transferring or securing
title to readily marketable staples shall be
subject to a limitation of 35 percent of
capital and surplus in addition to the general
limitations if the market value of the staples
59. Id.
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securing each additional loan or extension of
credit at all times equals or exceeds 115
percent of the outstanding amount of such loan
or extension of credit. The staple shall be
fully covered by insurance whenever it is
customary to insure such staples.
This exception allows national banks to lend up to 35 percent
of their capital and surplus if such loans are secured by bills of
lading, warehouse receipts or other documents of title issued in
connection with readily marketable staples. This exception
operates in conjunction with general limitations set forth in
Section 84(a)(1) and (a)(2).60
The rationale behind this exception is apparent. Like the
rationales for other exceptions discussed above, the staples
themselves provide a source of repayment. They must be
nonperishable and must be covered by insurance when this is the
custom. 1  Further, acceptable nonperishable staples may not be
held for more than 10 months, while refrigerated or frozen
nonperishables may not be held for more than six months.1
2
The market value of all staples must, at all times, equal or
exceed 115 percent of the outstanding loan amount. 3  For that
reason, the OCC has defined a "readily marketable staple" as an
item of commerce, agriculture or industry which is
characteristically the subject of dealings in a ready market with
frequent price quotations.64 This would include such commodities
as wheat and other grains, cotton, wool, and basic metals such as
tin, lead and copper." The market for a staple must be one in
which the price can be easily and definitely ascertained, and which
60. 12 C.F.R. S 32.6(c)(2) (1991).
61. 12 C.F.R. S 32.6(c) (3) (1991). It is important to note, however, that
refrigerated or frozen staples are considered to be non-perishable. Id.
62. 12 C.F.R. S 32.6(c)(5)(i), (ii) (1991).
63. While the language of this exception certainly seems to require that
the entire loan be secured by the staples, the occ has previously ruled that this
is not the case. Rather, only that portion of the loan over and above the
general 15% limitation of S 84(a)(1), for which there is no collateral
requirement, and the collateralized 10% limitation of S 84(a)(2), must be secured
in accordance with this exception.
Letter of Byrd, No. 185, (1981-82 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 85,266 (Mar. 11, 1981). (This opinion was issued prior to the dual
limitations of Section 84(a)(1) and (a)(2) at a time when a single ten percent
lending limit applied. However, its reasoning appears equally applicable to the
modern day two-tier general prohibitions of ten and fifteen percent).
64. 12 C.F.R. 5 32.6(c)(3) (1991).
65. Id.
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allows easy sale and realization of the staple without material
sacrifice of its collateral value.
66
Documentation securing the loan must provide the bank with
control of the commodity and the right to immediate possession.67
This requirement enables the institution to immediately obtain
possession in order to sell the collateral without protracted
litigation. Shipping documents, warehouse receipts, bills of
lading and other such documents which evidence title satisfy the
OCC's objective to maintain a right to immediate possession.68
Under this exception, risk is limited by collateral
requirements. However, through use of this exception, a single
borrower can receive loans which total up to 60 percent of a single
institution's capital and surplus since the exception allows
borrowings over and above general limitations set forth in Section
84(a)(1) and (a)(2). This exception would appear to raise serious
questions regarding the extent to which legislative concerns about
risk diversification and benefit spreading have been advanced.
4. Loans Secured by U.S. Obligations
An absolute exception to lending limits is provided in
12 U.S.C. S 84(c)(4):
Loans or extensions of credit secured by
bonds, notes, certificates of indebtedness, or
Treasury bills of the United States or by
other such obligations fully guaranteed as to
principal and interest by the United States
shall not be subject to any limitation based
on capital or surplus.
This exception draws its justification from the accepted
proposition that obligations of the United States of America expose
a lending institution to no credit risk. Nonetheless, since one
borrower could borrow all of a bank's available funds through this
exception, benefit spreading is inhibited.
The exception is founded upon the full faith and credit of the
United States Government. If the particular obligation in question
is not supported by the full faith and credit of the United States,
it does not qualify for the exception. 9 Following this principal,
the OCC has determined that Federal National Mortgage Association
66. Id.
67. 12 C.F.R. S 32.6(c)(6) (1991).
68. Id. § 32.6(c)(6).
69. Letter of Oda, No. 285, [1983-84 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 85,449 (Apr. 30, 1984).
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Guaranteed Mortgage-Backed Securities are fully subject to the
provisions of 12 U.S.C. S 84, while Government National Mortgage
Association pass-through securities are not. The OCC's position
was crisply stated as follows:
* . . The FNMA Guaranty constitutes an
obligation solely by FNMA and is not backed by
the full faith and credit of the United
States. [Citation omitted].
While FNMA enjoys certain privileges of
government sponsorship (citation omitted], it
is not a wholly-owned corporation of the
United States[.] . . . [T]he FNMA Guaranteed
Mortgage-Backed Security is an obligation of
FNMA, it is not a direct obligation of the
United States, nor is it backed by the full
faith and credit of the United States. A loan
secured by FNYA GMBS's therefore, would not
fall within the §84(c)(4) exception ...
[Government National Mortgage Association or]
GNMA pass-through securities are covered by
the S 84(c)(4) exception. GNMA pass-throughs
give rise a general obligation of the United
States. [Citation omitted.] To the extent
that the GNMA fully guarantees payment of
principal and interest on securities,
therefore, they are covered by the exemption.
Payment is fully guaranteed when it is to be
made regardless of whether the principal and
interest are actually collected . . . .0
(Emphasis added]
The 0CC is also quick to point out that if the market value of
the pledged collateral declines so that the loan is no longer in
conformance with this exception, and if the statute's general 15
percent limitation is exceeded, the loan must be brought into
conformance within five business days."'
5. Loans to or Guaranteed by a Federal Agency
12 U.S.C. § 84(c)(5) provides:
Loans or extensions of credit to or secured by
unconditional takeout commitments or
guarantees of any department, agency bureau,
board, commission or establishment of the
70. Id.
71. 12 C.F.R. S 32.6(d)(3) (1991).
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United States or any Corporation wholly owned
directly or indirectly by the United States
shall not be subject to any limitation based
on capital and surplus.
Like the exception above for obligations backed by the full
faith and credit of the United States government, this exception is
grounded in the presumed absence of credit risk associated with
federal government obligations. The absolute nature of the
exception suggests Congress was unconcerned that benefit spreading
would not be enhanced by the exception.
However, the OCC's respect for federal agencies is not
limitless. Agency commitments and guarantees must be payable in
cash or cash equivalent within 60 days after a demand for payment
is made 72 Although the guaranty or commitment must be
unconditional, minimal procedural requirements, such as
notification of default, may be acceptable."
Although this exception is technically distinguishable from
the preceding exception for full faith and credit obligations of
the United States, the practical distinction is negligible.
Pursuant to this exception, the OCC has determined that loans
insured by the Farmers Home Administration,74 the Small Business
Administration7' and the Commodity Credit Corporation76 are exempt
from the limitation of Section 84.
If the government is not fully liable for the loan, or if the
guaranteeing entity is not a legal subdivision of the government or
a wholly-owned corporation, the exception is not applicable. For
example, in denying the exception to Federal National Mortgage
Association guaranteed Mortgage-backed securities, the OCC stated:
Loans secured by FNMA GMBS's also are not
exempt under 12 U.S.C. S 84(c)(5). The
paragraph exempts from any lending limit a
loan secured by guaranties or unconditional
takeover commitments of the United States or a
wholly-owned corporation of the United States.
FNMA is not a wholly-owned corporation of the
United States; it is a Government-sponsored
72. 12 C.F.R. S 32.6(e)(3) (1991).
73. 12 C.F.R. S 32.6(e)(4) (1991).
74. COMTROLLM OF THE CupiENzcY RzGULATION INTERPzTATIONS, NzioNzAL BAnxImG REvzzw, Volume
II, No. 4 (June 1965).
75. Letter of shobkey, Chief Counsel, No. 141, [1979-1982 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,222 (May 19, 1980).
76. Letter of Byrd, Assistant Director, Legal Advisory services Division,
No. 59, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85,134 (Oct. 2,
1978).
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privately held corporation. Furthermore, §
84(c)(5).does not apply because FNMA does not
guarantee the obligation of the
borrower/pledgor to the bank. The FNMA
guaranty covers only the obligation of the
issuer to pay principal and interest as they
come due. Exception S 84(c)(5) is
inapplicable, therefore, because the
collateral is guaranteed, not the loan itself,
and because FNMA is not a wholly-owned
corporation of the United States."'
6. Loans Secured by Segregated Deposit Accounts
12 U.S.C. § 84(c)(6) provides:
Loans or extensions of credit secured by a
segregated deposit account in the lending bank
shall not be subject to any limitation based
on capital and surplus.
If a loan is secured by a deposit account in which the bank
has a perfected security interest, no lending limitation applies.
The risk associated with such a loan is minimized by the
availability of immediate cash repayment. In such a case, risk
diversification is unnecessary for security. Congressional concern
for spreading benefits was apparently not paramount in this case.
In order to assure that the circumstances surrounding a loan
continue to justify the rationale for the exception, banks must
establish internal procedures which prevent the release of the
security.8 The bank must also have a validly perfected security
interest under applicable state law.7" Although the deposit need
not be denominated in U.S. dollars, it must be freely convertible
and must be revalued at least monthly to ensure that the loan
remains fully secured."0  If the value of a foreign currency
deposit decliies sufficiently so that the loan is no longer fully
secured, and if the general 15 percent limitation is exceeded, the
loan must be brought into conformance within five business days.
The only exception to this rule would be if judicial or regulatory
proceedings or other extraordinary events frustrate efforts to
comply. '
7. OCC Approved Loans to Financial Institutions
77. See supra, note 69.
78. 12 C.F.R. S 32.6(f)(3) (1991).
79. 12 C.F.R. S 32.6(f)(2) (1991).
80. 12 C.F.R. 5 32.6(f)(4) (1991).
81. Id.
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Commonly known as the "emergency" exception, 12 U.S.C.
§ 84(c)(7) provides:
Loans or extensions of credit to any financial
institution or to any receiver, conservator,
superintendent of banks, or other agent in
charge of the business and property of such
financial institution, when such loans or
extensions of credit are approved by the
Comptroller of the Currency, shall not be
subject to any limitation based on capital and
surplus.
This exception applies only in extraordinary circumstances
where a national bank is called upon by the OCC to provide credit
to any other commercial bank, savings bank, savings and loan
association, credit union or trust company.82
8. Discount of Installment Consumer Paper
12 U.S.C. S 84(c)(8) provides:
(A) Loans and extensions of credit arising
from the discount of negotiable installment
consumer paper which carries a full recourse
endorsement or unconditional guaranty by the
person transferring the paper shall be subject
under this section to a maximum limitation
equal to 25 percent of such capital and
surplus, notwithstanding the collateral
requirements set forth in (12 U.S.C. §
84(a)(2)].
(B) If the bank's files or the knowledge of
its officers of the financial condition of
each maker of such consumer paper is
reasonably adequate, and an officer of the
bank designated for that purpose by the board
of directors of the bank certifies in writing
that the bank is relying primarily upon the
responsibility of each maker for payment of
such loans or extensions of credit and not any
full or partial recourse endorsement or
guaranty by the transferor, the limitations of
this section as to the loans or extensions of
credit of each such maker shall be the sole
applicable loan limitation.
82. 12 C.F.R. S 32.6(g)(2) (1991).
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This exception permits loans or extensions of credit which
arise from discounting negotiable or non-negotiable installment
consumer paper to be made to a maximum of 10 percent of capital and
surplus in excess of the 15 percent limitation set forth by 12
U.S.C. § 84(a)(1). Although-this exception addresses a different
form of collateral than required by § 84(a)(2), the exception caps
the total loans to the affected customer at 25 percent of capital
surplus."
The paper in question must be unconditionally guaranteed or
subject to full recourse endorsement." In certain cases, the
paper may be considered as a loan or extension of credit to the
maker, rather than to the seller of the paper. This may occur if
two qualifications are met: first, based on the bank's files or its
officer's knowledge, the bank must be able to demonstrate that each
maker is financially able to make good on the loan. Second, a bank
officer who is designated by the bank's board of directors must
certify in writing that the bank relies primarily upon the maker
for repayment, rather than upon the guaranty or endorsement of the
transferor. If these qualifications can be met, the loan is
subject only to the lending limits of the maker of the paper, not
its transferor.'s
For example, ABC Auto sells cars to Customers. Each Customer
pays ABC Auto with a signed installment note. ABC Auto discounts
the notes to Bank on a recourse basis. Pursuant to this exception,
Bank may extend credit to ABC Auto based on the discounting for up
to 10 percent of its capital and surplus in addition to the
standard 15 percent limitation of Section 84(a)(1). If evidence
were to show that ABC Auto and Bank agreed only to discount paper
from customers whose credit was pre-approved by Bank, and if Bank
maintains appropriate records, the discounting would not be
considered as an extension of credit to ABC Auto. Rather, Bank
would be considered to have made a loan to each individual
customer.
An interesting aspect of this exception is the expansive use
of the term "consumer". Many other statutory schemes define
consumer obligations as those which involve personal, household or
family purchases." In this case, however, 12 C.F.R. S 32.6(h) (3)
provides:
83. 12 C.F.R. S 32.6(h) (2) clearly establishes that this exception is not
in addition to the limitations established by 12 U.S.C. S 84(a)(2).
84. 12 C.F.R. S 32.6(h) (2) (1991). The unconditional guaranty is permitted
to be in the form of a repurchase agreement or a separate guaranty agreement.
85. 12 C.F.R. S 32.6(h)(5) (1991).
86. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. S 1602(h) (1991) (defining a consumer transaction
as one in which the party . . . is a natural person, and the money, property or
services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal,
family or household purposes.)
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For purposes of this (exception], "consumer"
means the user of any products, commodities,
goods, or services, whether leased or
purchased, and does not include any person who
purchases products or commodities for the
purpose of resale or for fabrication into
goods for sale.
Unlike more commonly used definitions, this definition of
"consumer" turns on whether or not the commodity is consumed by its
original purchaser or purchased for resale or as a component for
some larger good. Based upon this distinction, paper generated in
connection with the sale of farm chemicals to supply dealers has
been found not to meet the definition. Consequently, ordinary
lending limits apply.8 7 However, as part of the same ruling, the
OCC determined that paper generated in connection with the direct
sale of the same chemicals to farmers would qualify for the
exemption because the farmers were the ultimate consumers of the
chemicals."
9. Loans Secured by Livestock or Dairy Cattle
There are actually two exceptions from the statute's general
lending limitations set forth at 12 U.S.C. § 84(c)(9). That
section provides:
(A) Loans and extensions of credit secured by
shipping documents or instruments transferring
or securing title covering livestock or giving
a lien on livestock when the market value of
the livestock securing the obligation is not
at any time less than 115 percent of the face
87. Letter of Byrd, Assistant Director, Legal Advisory services Division,
No. 114, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,189 (July
18, 1979); See also, Comptroller of the Currency Letter, February 1, 1963, supra
note 47, (Paper arising out of sale to farmers of agricultural machinery may
qualify for exception); Comptroller of the Currency Letter, (1960-1966 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1 93,681 (Feb 1, 1963). (Lease paper issued
in connection with lease of cars and trucks to a business is entitled to
exception); Rulings of the comptroller of the currency, National Banking Review,
Vol. 3, No. 4, [1960-1966 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,460
(June 1966) (Full recourse installment notes discounted by a heavy equipment and
machinery dealer to a bank for discount are eligible for the exception; Full
recourse purchase money mortgages are "consumer paper" within the meaning of the
exception); Rulings of the comptroller of the Currency, National Banking Review,
Vol. 4, No. 1, (1960-1966 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,532
(september 1966) (Loan participation backed by an unconditional guaranty with
respect to loans made in connection with the sale of aircraft to foreign
commercial air carriers may qualify as consumer paper; *The equipment was
purchased for business use, not resale).
88. Letter of Byrd, Assistant Director, Legal Advisory services Division,
No. 114, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) s 85,189 (July
18, 1979).
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amount of the note covered, shall be subject
under this section, notwithstanding the
collateral requirements set forth in (12
U.S.C. § 84(a)(2)], to a maximum limitation
equal to 25 percent of such capital and
surplus.
(B) Loans and extensions of credit which arise
from the discount by dealers in dairy cattle
of paper given in payment for dairy cattle,
which paper carries a full recourse
endorsement or unconditional guaranty of the
seller and which are secured by the cattle
being sold, shall be subject under this
section, notwithstanding the collateral
requirements set forth in (12 U.S.C. §
84(a)(2) ], to a limitation of 25 percent of
such capital and surplus.
Under the first exception, national banks can make loans or
extend credit up to a maximum of 10 percent of capital and surplus
(in addition to the standard 15 percent limitation set forth in
Section 84(a)(1)) when: (1) the note evidencing the loan is
secured by shipping, title or security documents on livestock, and
(2) the market value of the livestock is, at all times, equal to at
least 115 percent of the face amount of the loan.89 The rationale
for this exception is that collateral can be readily liquidated.
Therefore, the bank's risk is minimized. Accordingly, the value of
the collateral is paramount. The OCC requires banks to maintain
annually updated inspection and appraisal reports on file.9"
The second exception permits loans or extensions of credit up
to a maximum of 10 percent of capital and surplus (in addition to
§ 84(a)(1)'s 15 percent limitation) if the loan arises from the
discounting of dealer purchase paper. The paper must be secured by
the cattle sold, and must be unconditionally guaranteed by or
subject to the full recourse endorsement of its seller.9"
These two exceptions are mutually exclusive. Therefore, a
national bank may make two separate loans to the same person, each
secured by one of the two types of collateral described above.
89. Again, although the language of this statutory exception suggests
otherwise, it would seem logical that the only portion of the loan which must be
collateralized by the livestock is that portion which exceeds the general 15%
limitation set forth in Section 84(a)(1). See supra, note 63. The reader,s
attention is drawn to the fact, however, that the exception refers to 115% of the
face amount of the note covered. This language certainly presents a less
compelling case for the foregoing interpretation.
90. 12 C.F.R. S 32.6(i)(l)(ii) (1991).
91. 12 C.F.R. S 32.6(i)(2)(ii) (1991).
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Each loan would be subject to a 10 percent capital and surplus
limitation in addition to the 15 percent limitation of
84(a) (1) 92
10. Student Loan Marketing Association Loans
12 U.S.C. § 84(c)(10) provides:
Loans or extensions of credit to the Student
Loan Marketing Association shall not be
subject to any limitation based on capital and
surplus.
The Student Loan Marketing Association, like FNMA,'3 is not
a wholly-ownedcorporation of the United States and does not enjoy
full faith and credit backing. However, Congress apparently
decided that social benefits derived from its activities outweigh
any risk of harm that could result from the exception. Since
student loans are made to many individuals, benefit spreading and
risk diversification appear to have been served.
II. COMBINING OF LOANS TO SEPARATE BORROWERS
Although 0CC regulations provide guidance in interpreting the
statute's general limitations and specific exceptions, they
principally focus on identifying circumstances in which "a loan
putatively made to a person shall . . . be attributed to another
person."94 These per se attribution rules apply in cases involving
loans to partnerships and corporations. However, even loans which
are not prohibited per se may run afoul of the "direct benefit"
and/or the "common enterprise" tests. Each of these rules of
attribution is examined below.
A. The Direct Benefit Test
A loan or extension of credit to one person will be attributed
to another person if the proceeds of the loan are used for the
direct benefit of the other person."s
The decision whether a given series of loans must be combined
under the direct benefit test is necessarily fact-specific. This
should not imply that the issue is complicated or obtuse, however.
Simply stated, the determination turns on the actual, as opposed to
the stated beneficiary of the loan.
92. 12 C.F.R. S 32.6(i)(3) (1991).
93. See supra, notes 69, 70, 71 and accompanying text.
94. 12 U.S.C. S 84(d)(2) (1991).
95. 12 C.F.R. S 32.5(a)(1)(i) (1991).
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In DelJunco v. Conover," the OCC sought to combine three
loans ostensibly made to different persons. The first loan had
been made to Lewis, the President of Fame Furniture Co., Inc.
("Fame"). The second loan was made to Fame itself. The third was
made to Ware, Fame's Treasurer. At an OCC hearing, the bank and
its directors admitted they knew that the Lewis loan proceeds were
used for Fame's benefit. It was further determined that the Ware
loan was obtained to fund an overdraft in Fame's checking account.
The bank's loan officer knew that the loan proceeds were going to
go through Mr. Ware to Fame. Specific discussions regarding
lending limits had taken place between Ware, Lewis and the bank's
officers. Finally, it was shown that the Ware proceeds were
deposited directly to Fame's checking account by the bank.
Employing the direct benefit test, the OCC determined that
aggregation of those loans was appropriate. The Ninth Circuit
agreed. The loans had really been obtained for Fame's benefit,
notwithstanding the fact that they were putatively made to other
seemingly unrelated individuals. '
A common instance where the direct benefit test may be
appropriate arises if an individual borrows funds to purchase an
equity interest in a business. In such a case, a loan is made to
the individual who uses the funds to purchase stock or a
partnership interest. The OCC has repeatedly determined that if
loan proceeds are used to purchase an interest in an entity a
benefit has been conferred upon the entity. Therefore, the loan
must be attributed to the entity which was purchased.98 Obviously,
when considering successively smaller ownership positions, a point
must be reached when any benefit to the business entity becomes
sufficiently attenuated that it is unreasonable to require
attribution. For example, loan proceeds might be used to purchase
only one share of General Motors stock. In such an instance, the
OCC would surely exercise its prerogative to find that no direct
benefit was received.99
96. 683 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1982).
97. see also, Anderson v. Ahers, 7 F. Supp. 924 (W.D. Ky. 1934) (loans
made to firm's employees for benefit of corporation attributed); National Bank
of corsicana v. Johnson, 251 U.S. 68 (1919); First National Bank of Lincolnwood
v. Keller, 318 F. Supp. 339, 343 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (loans to employees or
shareholders which are, in reality, loans to their corporation, are properly
attributable).
98. Letter of Byrd, Assistant Director, Legal Advisory Services Division,
No. 15, (1978-1979 Transfer Binder) Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,090 (Jan. 28,
1978) (loan to individual to purchase one-third interest in corporation
attributed to corporation). see also, Letter of Byrd, Assistant Director, Legal
Advisory Services Division, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 185,039 (September 30, 1977) (borrowing to purchase limited partnerships;
Ruling based upon "common enterprise" theory); Letter of Byrd, Assistant
Director, Legal Advisory services Division, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,011 (Aug. 12, 1977) (loans passed through to a general
partnership are attributed to such entity by virtue of "common enterprise").
99. Id.
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A more difficult fact pattern occurs when A borrows money for
the express purpose of repaying a bona fide debt of ABC Corp. In
this case, one commentator has opined that the determination will
turn on whether A could have repaid ABC Corp. without the bank
loan. If A could have afforded the expense, combination would be
inappropriate since ABC Corp. derived no benefit that could not
have been obtained directly from A. However, if A would have been
unable to pay ABC Corp., then ABC Corp. directly benefitted from
use of the loan proceeds. Therefore, aggregation would be
appropriate. 100
B. The "Common Enterprise" Tests
The common enterprise tests also turn upon a factual
assessment of the circumstances surrounding the transaction in
question. "' A common enterprise will generally be found to exist
if any of the following circumstances are present:
(i) The expected source of repayment is the
same for each of the individual borrowers; or
(ii) The loans are made to persons who are
related through common control and the persons
are engaged in interdependent businesses or
significant financial interdependence between
them is present; or
(iii) Separate individuals borrow in order to
acquire a business enterprise in which they
will own greater than 50 percent of the voting
securities."1'
1. Common Repayment Source
Since one of the accepted purposes of the statute is to
encourage risk diversification, loans to separate persons must be
considered in combination when those persons will look to a single
source for repayment of the loans. If that source of repayment is
impaired, both loans would be affected.
Consider the following: XYZ Widget Company ("XYZ") is a
national manufacturing corporation. As part of its distribution
chain, XYZ owns warehouses located throughout the United States.
For business reasons apart from lending limit concerns, XYZ's
warehouses located in each state are owned by separate
subsidiaries. Accordingly, warehouses in North Carolina are owned
100. William B. Glidden, National Bank Lending Limits and the Comptroller,s
Regs.: A Clarification, 101 BANING L.J. 430, 432 (July-August, 1984).
101. 12 C.F.R. S 32.5(a)(2)(i) (1991).
102. 12 C.F.R. S 32.5(a)(2)(ii-iv) (1991).
NATIONAL BANK LENDING LIMITS
by "XYZ North Carolina" while warehouses in Maryland are owned by
"XYZ Maryland". XYZ owns one hundred percent of each subsidiary.
Except for owning the warehouses in which XYZ stores its goods,
each subsidiary conducts no other business.
In such a case, loans or extensions of credit to XYZ would
also be attributed to each subsidiary corporation.'0 3  Moreover,
loans to any subsidiary would be attributable to all of the other
subsidiaries and to XYZ corporation.'0 " This is because XYZ and
its subsidiaries each have only the resources of XYZ to repay its
debts. Therefore, in order to minimize risk, such loans must be
aggregated for lending limit purposes. Benefit spreading is
fdstered by the restriction since it discourages any one individual
or entity from misusing corporate instrumentalities to borrow more
than his reasonable share of any institution's available loan
funds.
2. Common Control
Two persons may be found to engage in a common enterprise if
they are related through common control and are either engaged in
independent businesses or substantial financial interdependence
exists between them. Substantial financial interdependence exists
per se, "when 50 percent or more of one person's gross receipts or
gross expenditures (on an annual basis) are derived from
transactions with one or more persons related through common
control . . .,,05
Circumstances under which common control is presumed to exist
include:
(a) One or more persons acting in concert
directly or indirectly own, control, or have
power to vote 25 percent or more of any class
of voting securities or another person; or
(b) One or more persons acting in concert
control, in any manner, the election of a
majority of the directors, trustees, or other
103. 12 C.F.R. S 32.5(a)(2)(ii) (1991); cf. 12 C.F.R. S 32.5(b)(2) (1991).
104. 12 C.F.R. 5 32.5(a)(2)(ii) (1991).
105. 12 C.F.R. S 32.5(a)(2)(iii) (1991). see also, Letter of Firtzgerald,
Chief Counsel, No. 352, [1984-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
1 85,522 (sept. 23,1985) (reversing a long-standing rule which interpreted the
per se test as requiring that where several entities are under common control and
one of several entities derives its gross receipt or expenditures from
transactions with the others, the gross receipts or expenditures would be added
together to determine whether they amounted to fifty percent or more, and stating
a new rule as being triggered only when one entity derives the full fifty percent
of its gross receipts or expenditures from transactions with another entity under
common control).
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persons exercising similar functions of
another person; or
(c) Any other circumstances exist which
indicate that one or more persons acting in
concert directly or indirectly exercise a
controlling influence over the management or
policies of another person.106
For example, consider the following: A is an individual
owning one hundred per cent of the stock of ABC, Inc. ("ABC"), a
corporation engaged in the retail sales of shoes. ABC, in turn,
owns seventy five per cent of XYZ, Inc. ("XYZ"), a shoe wholesaling
corporation. XYZ wholesales to many other retailers, but ABC
accounts for twenty five per cent of XYZ's annual revenues. The
activities of XYZ generate twenty five per cent of ABC's total
annual revenues. An additional ten per cent is attributable to its
ABC's retail shoe sales.
XYZ has two wholly-owned subsidiaries: Soles, Inc. ("Soles")
and Heels, Inc. ("Heels"). Both corporations are manufacturing
entities named for their products. Soles sells ninety per cent of
its product to XYZ and these sales generate ninety per cent of its
annual revenues. Heels, sells twenty five per cent of its product
to XYZ thereby generating twenty five per cent of its revenues.
In addition, XYZ owns ten per cent of Realty, Inc. ("Realty"),
a corporation engaged in the ownership of local real estate.
Realty's properties generate positive cash flow. Thus, Realty
stands on its own without support from its various shareholders.
XYZ's revenue from Realty amounts to one to two per cent of its
total revenues. Realty's other owners are located outside the
geographic area. In order to assure the proper administration of
the corporation's affairs, a voting trust has been established,
vesting majority control in XYZ.
ABC also owns one hundred per cent of Aloha, Inc. ("Aloha"),
a regional travel agency. In recent years, ABC revenues derived
from travel-related activities have substantially exceeded those
obtained through shoe manufacturing, wholesaling and retailing.
ABC currently derives sixty five per cent of its annual revenues
from Aloha's activities.
As a result of A's extensive business dealings, his
relationship with his children, Gary and Flo, has suffered. In
order to compensate for this loss, when each reached the age of
majority, A set each sibling up in his or her own business with
$100,000 of A's personal funds. As a condition for the gift, A
required each child to promise to follow A's wishes in running his
106. 12 C.F.R. S 32.5(a)(2)(v)(A-C) (1991).
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or her business until A was satisfied that they could succeed on
their own.
A's son Gary became president of Gary's Gloves, Inc. ("Gary"),
a corporation devoted to the manufacture and sale of fine handware.
Unfortunately, Gary's business faltered. He was forced to borrow
money from his father on an annual basis. Gary borrowed so heavily
that it is doubtful that the business can survive without A's
continued contributions.
On the other hand, Flo, A's other child, prospered. She
opened Flo's Florist, Inc. ("Flo"), a corporation that specialized
in floral wedding decorations. After A's initial capital
contribution, Flo's business was able to operate on a stand-alone
basis. Flo continued to adhere strictly to her father's wishes
with respect to the operation of the business.
Shortly after Gary and Flo opened their respective businesses,
they each purchased a fifty per cent ownership share in Rental,
Inc. ("Rental"). Rental's sole function was to own and operate the
building occupied by Flo and Gary. It had no other assets. Its
sole revenues consisted of rental payments made by Gary and Flo.
Although the foregoing fact pattern is complex, A's "financial
empire" will illustrate all of the common control/common enterprise
rules of attribution.
A common enterprise exists between A and ABC since A controls
more than twenty five per cent of the voting securities of ABC.
Since he derives all of his income from ABC, A can be viewed as
substantially financially dependent upon ABC's activities. A per
se common enterprise exists because A derives more than fifty
percent of his annual gross receipts from the activities of ABC.
A common enterprise exists between ABC and Aloha. Aloha is
wholly-owned by ABC. Substantial financial interdependence exists
between the two entities since Aloha is responsible for sixty five
per cent of ABC's annual revenues, satisfying the requirements of
the fifty per cent per se rule.
The relationship between ABC and XYZ is another example of a
common enterprise, but for different reasons. ABC owns seventy
five per cent of XYZ, thereby establishing common control.
However, XYZ is not responsible for fifty per cent or more of ABC's
annual revenues. As such, substantial financial interdependence
does not exist on a per se basis. However, ABC and XYZ engage in
interdependent businesses. Therefore, a common enterprise can
still be said to exist between ABC and XYZ.
Soles and Heels are both related to XYZ by common control.
They are wholly-owned subsidiaries. It is not necessary to apply
the percentage of revenue test to Soles and Heels because b6th
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companies engage in interdependent businesses with XYZ owing to
their supply relationship. Because of this, a common enterprise
exists.
XYZ and Realty are not a common enterprise. Although control
may be readily exerted by the voting trust, Realty and XYZ are not
financially dependent upon each other, nor are they engaged in
supporting lines of business.
A's relationship with his childrens' corporations illustrates
A's de facto control of both Gary and Flo. However, while a common
enterprise exists between A and Gary, the same cannot be said of
the relationship between A and Flo. In the former instance,
substantial financial interdependence exists between A and Gary. In
the latter instance, neither financial interdependence nor
businesses interdependence exist between A and Flo.
Finally, common enterprises exist between Gary and Rental, and
also between Flo and Rental. These common enterprises exist
because Rental is entirely dependent on Gary and Flo for its
livelihood.
It must be remembered that the attribution rules are
structured to recognize the concept of compounding. In other
words, if D's loans are attributed to C, and if C's loans are
attributed to B, then D's loans are attributable to B.'"7  The
"step-ladder" approach necessarily means that loans between
seemingly far-removed entities may be attributed to each other as
if the parties were related. For example, as the application of
the attribution rules to A's empire discloses, a loan to Heels can
be attributed to A. The progression is as follows: Heels' loan is
attributed to XYZ. The "XYZ" loan is then attributed to A. This
compounding rule reaches down the ladder, as well as up. In other
words, since Heels' loans are attributable to A, and since a common
enterprise exists between A and Gary, Heels' loans may also be
attributed to Gary. Moreover, since Gary's loans are attributable
to Rental, and Rental's loans are attributable to Flo, Gary's and,
thus A's and Heels' loans are attributable to Flo."8
107. Recognition of this doctrine is not specifically articulated in either
the statute or the regulations. It is a sensible requirement and necessarily
implied in that its absence would allow easy avoidance of the statute merely by
"layering" a sufficient number of entities. undoubtedly, the occ's broad
interpretation powers will be used to analyze each case on its particular facts.
Cf. Hughes v. Reed, 46 F.2d 435, 442 (10th Cir. 1939).
108. When examined, the result makes perfect sense. A practical example
of its application is demonstrated by analyzing what would happen if financial
disaster were to befall Flo. Under our example, she would arguably be unable to
support the activity of Rental. This would affect Gary. Together, Gary and Flo
would turn to A for support. A's ability to contribute capital to ABC could be
endangered, thus affecting ABc's ability to support and maintain its business
relationship with XYZ. XYZ, having been affected in its relationship with ABC
might curtail its activities with Heels. Thus, in the final analysis, Heels,
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Only Realty escapes unscathed because no common enterprise
exists between it and any other person. It is, therefore,
insulated from the compounding effect.
3. Majority Acquisition
The majority acquisition test requires attribution among
persons who borrow in order to acquire more than fifty percent of
the voting securities of a business enterprise."0 '  Such a
conclusion is compelled by common sense. Where the express purpose
of a loan to two or more individuals is to assist them in creating
a controlling interest in a business that will, of necessity,
create financial interdependence among all members of the group,
the common enterprise test is satisfied.
C. Loans to Partnerships
A loan to a general partnership is considered as a loan to
each general partner of the partnership.110  For example, assume
that Bank has made a loan of $1,000,000 to the ABC partnership. If
Bank's lending limit is $1,000,000, Bank is not permitted to make
any further loans to ABC Partnership. Bank also may not make
additional loans to the individual partners of ABC Partnership
because of the partnership attribution rules.
The reason for this attribution rule is that each general
partner could be called upon to satisfy ABC's loan in its
entirety."1  Since any partner of ABC partnership could be
compelled to pay the loan personally, the OCC reasons that risk
diversification and benefit-spreading- motivations of 12 U.S.C. § 84
are best served by requiring attribution.
A more interesting scenario will arise if Bank makes a non-
recourse loan to ABC Partnership. Since the OCC's rationale in the
partnership cases stems from the common law liability of individual
partners, it would appear that limiting such liability would defeat
the purpose of the rule. However, the OCC has ruled that the
adoption of such a position would "(encourage] banks to exclude
loan has been affected by Flo's misfortune. Again, the oCC will, undoubtedly,
utilized its discretion to determine the extent to which any particular fact
pattern represents a realistic model for application of the rule and the extent
to which compounding will be employed.
109. 12 C.F.R. S 32.5(a)(2)(iv) (1991).
110. 12 C.F.R. S 32.5(c)(1) (1991). A joint venture is, for section 84
purposes, treated like a partnership and loans to the venture are considered
loans to the venturers. Letter of Byrd, Assistant Director, Legal Advisory
services Division, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCE) A
85,018 (Aug. 29, 1977).
111. Joint and several tort liability is the essence of a partnership at
common law. see, e.g., Weaver v. Marcus, 165 F.2d 862 (4th cir. 1948). see
also, UNIFORM PARTNzSHuP ACT S 15, 6 U.L.A. 174 (1969).
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borrowers from personal liability in situations where banking
prudence, and thus the intent of section 84, clearly counsel
otherwise."'112  The OCC has further reasoned that neither of the
statutes' underlying purposes would be served by such a rule.
Investment risk would actually be increased, and the same borrowers
would have access to additional loans from the same bank.
113
Thus, making a loan to a general partnership on a non-recourse
basis has no impact on the application of the partnership
attribution rules.
Although closely related to non-recourse general partnership
loans, loans to limited partnerships have received more favorable
treatment from OCC. A loan to a limited partnership is not
automatically required to be attributed to each of the limited
partners.11  Although the liability of the limited partners is
essentially equivalent to the liability of a non-recourse general
partner, the 0CC justifies this distinction by the fact that
limited partnerships generally contemplate that the limited
partners will not participate in management.'" Since a limited
partner is not directing the activities of the partnership, his
status is similar to that of a shareholder. Therefore, attribution
would be inappropriate. If however, limited partners engage in
conduct with respect to each other or the partnership which
satisfies the direct benefit or common enterprise test, attribution
may be required."'  For example, if a limited partner were to
borrow to fund his purchase of an interest in the limited
112. Letter of Byrd, Assistant Director, Legal Advisory Services Division,
No. 164 [1979-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 9 85,245; See
also, Letter of Fitzgerald, Director, Legal Advisory Services Division, No. 149
[1979-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,230 (May 28, 1980)
(Contractual Liability of a partner is not the focus of Section 84); Letter of
Kane, District Counsel, Central District, No. 88-3, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 84,043 (March 29, 1988).
113. Id.
114. 12 C.F.R. S 32.5(c)(3) (1991). See also, Letter of Byrd, Assistant
Director, Legal Advisory services Division, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,039 (Sept. 30, 1977); Letter of Kane, District
Counsel, Central District, No. 88-3, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) 84,043 (March 29, 1988); Letter of Byrd, Assistant Director, Legal
Advisory Services Division, No. 126, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CC) 1 85,207 (Nov. 8, 1979); Letter of Kane, District Counsel, Central
District, No. 88-1 [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
84,207 (March 9, 1988).
115. Letter of Byrd, Assistant Director, Legal Advisory services Division,
No. 126, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,207 (Nov.
8, 1979).
116. Letter of Kane, District Counsel, Central District, No. 88-1, [1988-
1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCN) 84,041 (March 9, 1988); Letter
of Byrd, Assistant Director, Legal Advisory Services Division, [1978-1979
Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85, 039 (Sept. 30, 1977); Letter
of Byrd, Assistant Director, Legal Advisory services Division, No. 126, 2 [1979-
1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85,207 (Nov. 8, 1979).
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partnership, attribution of the partner's loans would be
warranted."7
Under certain circumstances, loans to individual partners may
be attributable to the partnership. This could arise if the 0CC
determines that requirements of the direct benefit and/or either of
the common enterprise tests have been met." 8  In addition, loans
to one partner may be attributable to another partner if it can be
shown that any of the tests have been satisfied by the relationship
between the partners." ' If it can be shown that a loan was made
to a partner in order to fund his purchase of a partnership
interest, that person's loan will automatically be attributable to
the partnership.120  Consider, for example, the-following. X, Y
and Z combine to form the XYZ partnership. X and Y borrow from
First bank to the extent of their individual lending limits.
Thereafter each lends the cash to the partnership. Z has an
outstanding personal obligation to First Bank which is unrelated to
the XYZ partnership. Z's obligation is sufficient to exhaust First
bank's legal lending limit as to Z. According to these facts,
serious lending limit violations appear to have occurred.
It is clear that the loans to X and Y will be cross-attributed
because of their involvement in a common enterprise. Since X and
Y have each reached their individual lending limits, the
attribution of another loan to them will cause a violation.
Further, each of the loans will be attributed to the partnership.
This is because XYZ partnership has received the direct benefit of
the loan proceeds. Because the loans to X and Y have already
reached the bank's limit, the attribution of both loans to the
partnership will cause another lending limit violation. Finally,
the attribution of the X and Y loans to the partnership will be
considered as loans to each of the other partners. Therefore, for
lending limit purposes, the outstanding debt of Z includes not only
his original personal loan, but the loans to X and Y as well,
resulting in an additional lending limit violation.'
D. Loans to Corporations
117. See supra, note 114, Letter of Byrd, No. 126 (Nov. 8, 1979 and sept.
30, 1977).
118. Id.
119. 12 C.F.R. 5 32.5(c)(2) (1991).
120. Id.
121. while this result may be harsh as it relates to Z, the reader is
reminded to focus upon the underlying purposes of Section 84. See also, Letter
of Byrd, Assistant Director, Legal Advisory services Division, (1978-1979
Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,011 (Sept. 30, 1977) (citing
Mills V. Riggle, 83 Kan. 703, 112 P. 617 (1911) for the proposition that, under
certain circumstances, a partnership can be called upon to satisfy the debts of
its individual partners.)
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In contrast to prior regulations,'22 current OCC policy does
not require the automatic. combination of loans made to a
corporation with loans to the majority-owned subsidiaries of the
corporation. 1 23  Similarly, loans to various subsidiaries of the
same corporation need not be combined with each other.'2 4  Rather,
such combinations are warranted only when it is determined that one
of the "common enterprise" tests has been satisfied between the
subsidiaries.12' Notwithstanding this, loans by national banks to
a single corporate group may not exceed fifty per cent of the
bank's capital and unimpaired surplus. 12G A corporate group is
defined to include a corporation and all of its subsidiaries. 27
E. Accommodation Parties
A drawer, endorser or guarantor is not considered to have
received a loan or extension of credit for § 84 purposes unless
that person receives any portion or direct benefit of the proceeds
122. see, former 12 C.F.R. S 7.1310(c) (1991), which provided as follows:
General Rules.
,(1) obligations of a parent corporation shall be combined with
obligations of all subsidiary corporations in which the parent owns
or controls a majority interest.
(2) If the Parent corporation is not borrowing, obligations of
subsidiary corporations are generally not combined except in the
following situations:
(i) Bank is looking to a single source for repayment of
the loan.
(ii) one or more loans is [sic] for the accommodation
of the parent corporation or other subsidiary.
(iii) The borrowing corporations are not separate
concerns in reality but merely departments or divisions
of a single enterprise.
(3) obligations of a corporation must be combined with any other
extension of credit the proceeds of which are used for the benefit
of the corporation.
123. 12 C.F.R. S 32.5(b)(2) (1991).
124. Id.
125. Id. It is peculiar that the occ's regulations do not specifically
require attribution among corporations if the "direct benefit" test is satisfied.
The reader is, however, reminded that a corporation is a "person" within the
meaning of S84(b)(2). Accordingly, the OCC could convincingly maintain that the
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or unless that person is engaged in a common enterprise, as
determined by 12 C.F.R. § 32.5(a)(1), with the primary obligor."'
III. STATUTORY LIABILITY FOR NON-COMPLIANCE
Prior to passage of the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA")129, bank directors
were liable for engaging in excessive lending only if: (1) they
knowingly participated in or assented to the extensions of
credit,"' or (2) if they deliberately refrained from
investigating despite information which placed them on notice of
the existence of a potential violation.' Mere negligence was
generally held to be insufficient to support a claim of
violation.132  However, the mere absence of improper motive was
not viewed as a viable defense.13
3
The provisions of FIRREA created a new three-tiered approach
to civil violations of the National Bank Act ("Act"), including §
84. Each tier provides increasingly severe penalties meant to
address progressively more egregious conduct.
Tier one is embodied at 12 U.S.C. § 93(b)(1), which provides:
First Tier. Any national banking association
which, and any institution-affiliated party
. . . with respect to such association who,
violates any provision of [the Act] . . . or
any regulation issued pursuant thereto, shall
forfeit and pay a civil penalty of not more
than $5,000 for each day during which such
violation continues.
First-tier violations are viewed as least significant by
regulators. Despite this, it is notable that the scienter
128. 12 C.F.R. S 32.101. The OCC has held that, despite the language of
12 C.F.R. S 32.101 which mandates attribution if the accommodation party receives
any benefit, the test that is actually employed is whether any "substantial
benefit" has been obtained. Letter of Oda, senior Attorney, Legal Advisory
Services Division, No. 291, [1984 -1987 Transfer Binder] (CCH) 1 85,461 (May 4,
1984).
129. Public Law, 101-647 (1989).
130. Atherton v. Anderson, 86 F.2d 518, 527 (6th Cir. 1936) rev'd on other
grounds sub non, Anderson v. Atherton, 302 U.S. 643 (1937); Payne v. Ostrus, 50
F.2d 1039, 1041 (6th Cir. 1931); First Nat'l Bank of Fairbanks v. Noyes, 257 F.
593, 599 - 600 (9th cir. 1919), McRoberts v. Spaulding, 32 F.2d 315, 318 (S.D.Iw.
1929); McQueen V. First Nat'l Bank Mesa City, AZ., 283 P. 273, 276 (Az. 1929).
131. Atherton, supra note 131; White v. Thomas, 37 F.2d 452, 454 (9th cir.
1929); McQueen, supra note 130.
132. Atherton, supra note 131; Payne, supra note 130; First Nat'l Bank of
Fairbanks, supra note 130.
133. McRoberts, supra note 130.
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requirement previously contained in 12 U.S.C. S 93 has been
removed. Accordingly, even unintentional violations of the act are
now sufficient to warrant the imposition of civil penalties.
The second layer of offensive conduct is described at 12
U.S.C. § 93(b)(2) which provides:
Second Tier. Notwithstanding Paragraph (1),
any national banking association which, and
any institution-affiliated party . . . with
respect to such association who, commits any
violation described in Paragraph (1) which --
(A)(i) commits any violation described in
(12 U.S.C. § 93(b)(1)];
(ii) recklessly engages in an unsafe or
unsound practice in conducting the
affairs of such association; or
(iii) breaches and fiduciary duty; and
(B) which violation, practice or breach
(i) is part of a pattern of misconduct;
(ii) causes or is likely to cause more
than minimal loss to such
association; or
(iii) results in pecuniary gain or other
benefit to such party,
shall forfeit and pay a civil penalty of not
more than $25,000 for each day during which
such violation, practice or breach continues.
While tier one violations can be inadvertent in nature and
result in only minimal loss to the affected institution, tier two
violations reflect Congress' intent to punish those activities
which: (1) are part of a pattern of misconduct; (2) result in
significant loss to the institution; or (3) result in a pecuniary
gain to the party responsible for the violation. Like tier one
violations, violations of tier two may be established without
proving intent, but the presence of aggravating factors tend to
suggest the possibility of intentional conduct.
Third tier violations occur when a person knowingly engages in
proscribed conduct and knowingly or recklessly causes a substantial
loss to the institution or the accrual of a substantial pecuniary
gain for his own benefit. 12 U.S.C. § 93(b)(3) provides:
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Third Tier. Notwithstanding Paragraph (1) and
(2), any national banking association which,
and any institution-affiliated party . . .
with respect to such association who --
(A) Knowingly
(i) commits any violation described in
Paragraph (1);
(ii) engages in any unsafe or unsound
practice in conducting the affairs
of such association; or
(iii) breaches any fiduciary duty; and
(B) Knowingly or recklessly causes a
substantial loss to such association
or a substantial pecuniary gain or
other benefit to such party by
reason of such violation, practice
or breach,
shall forfeit and pay a civil penalty [in the
case of any person other than the national
banking association, an amount to not exceed
$1,000,000, and in the case of a national
banking association, an amount not to exceed
the lesser of $1,000,000 or 1 percent of the
total assets of such association.]134
In addition to civil penalties, 12 U.S.C. S 93 provides that
bank officials who knowingly violate § 84 can be held liable for
damages sustained as a consequence of their actions. The 0CC has
broad power to fashion remedies in furtherance of such damage
claims. For example, in DelJunco the 0CC examined the following
loan sequence:
Loan Lending
Date Borrower Amount Limit Excess
1/19/79 Lewis $225,000
5/9/79 Fame 225,000
134. Although presenting the potential for substantial penalties, the Act
also allows for the mitigation of those penalties in view of the following
factors.
a. The size of financial resources and good faith of the insured
depository institution or other person charged;
b. The gravity of the violation;
c. The history of previous violations;
d. such other matters as justice may require.
12 U.S.C. S 93(b)(5); 12 U.S.C. 5 1818(i) (2) (G) (i-iv).
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SUBTOTAL $450,000 $272,866 $177,134
6/11/79 Ware 125,00
TOTAL $575,000 $277,108 $297,892
Following a determination by the OCC that combination of the
above loans was warranted, consideration turned to the extent of
director liability. The OCC found that the measure of liability
was $350,000. This represented the total of all loans ($575,000)
less the legal Lewis loan of $225,000.135 Further, the OCC
determined that'none of that liability could be reduced until the
legal loan was repaid. The directors, on the other hand, sought to
apply monies received first to the improper facilities, then to the
legal loan.
In finding that the director's efforts to give primacy to
collecting the illegal loans were invalid, the Ninth Circuit
stated:
135. See, First Nat'l Bank of Lincolnwood v. Keller, 318 F. Supp. 339, 347
(N.D. Ill. 1970) (Penalty properly assessed as the difference between greatest
amount of combined obligations and amount of outstanding legal loan amounts
before illegal loans were made).
See also, Corsicana Nat'l Bank of Corsicdna v. Johnson, 251 U.s. 68 (1919),
(distinguished in Lincolnwood, supra) wherein the Court dealt with two $15,000
loans which were made simultaneously and at a time when the banks lending limit
was $20,000. After combining the loans as a result of a common enterprise
finding, the court determined that the damages were properly set at the full
$30,000, stating:
We assume that if, in good faith and in the ordinary
course of business, defendant had made a loan of $20,000
to (the obligors], and if while this loan remained
unpaid he had afterwards and as a s ep a r a t e
transaction unlawfully loaned them an additional $10,000
in excess of the limit. The damage largely attributable
to his violation of the limiting provisions would have
been $10,000. But that is not this case. According to
the evidence, the $30,000, less discount, was paid out
by the bank as a single payment; and, if the jury found
it to have been loaned in excess of the statutory limit
. . . it must be upon the ground that it was a single
transaction. That being so it would follow that the
entire amount disbursed by the bank was disbursed in
violation of the law. The cause of action against a
director knowingly participating in or assenting to such
excessive loan would be complete at that moment, and
entire; there would be no legal presumption that the
borrowers would have accepted a loan within the limit,
if their application for the excessive loan had been
refused; nor that a director who in fact violated his
duty as defined by law would be mindful of it, have
loaned them even $20,000 . . . . Hence the entire
excessive loan would have to be the basis for computing
the damages of the bank. Id. at 87-88.
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In the instant case, the purpose underlying 12
U.S.C. § 84--protection of a bank's assets--
will be furthered if the Directors are not
allowed to extinguish their liability until
the legal Lewis loan, which is unsecured, is
fully repaid. The policy of protecting bank
assets would be frustrated if the Directors
were allowed to make, as they did, an
unsecured but legal loan to the borrower, then
to use or agree to the use of, the borrower's
assets to secure further credit extensions
that are illegal. Such a procedure would
permit the Directors to protect themselves
fully against any exposure resulting from the
illegal loans while substantially increasing
the risk that the bank would be unable to
recover the amount of its legal loan. The
fiduciary responsibility of the Directors of
the bank precludes them from protecting
themselves against liability at the bank's
expense. The security arrangement was in
derogation of that responsibility. Thus, the
Directors may not use borrower's assets to
extinguish their own liability to the bank.
Here, the Directors ignored the recommendation
of the Comptroller and the bank president's
advice that the first loan to be paid off
should be that of . . . Lewis and not Fame .
., since the stockholders might claim that
this loan was paid to limit the liability of
Directors. The Comptroller's remedy is
appropriate, because any other remedy could
create a conflict between the Bank and its
Directors.
In light of the Comptroller's broad discretion
to fashion an appropriate remedy, we conclude
that the remedy selected was lawful. It
serves to protect the banks assets, to insure
that the Directors fulfill their fiduciary
duty, and to prevent the Directors from
insuring themselves against liability for
their wrongful act at the Bank's expense. 136
[Emphasis added].
After supporting the OCC's determination of the order of loan
recovery, the Court went even further. The OCC had assessed
collection expenses and attorney's fees incurred by the bank in the
calculation of the Directors' damages. Citing the "[d]eference
136. DelJunco v. Conover, 682 F.2d 1338, 1343.
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. . due to the [OCC's] interpretation of the law under which [it]
operates", the Court found the assessment valid. The Court pointed
out that 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) allows the OCC to take affirmative
action to correct conditions that result from a director's
violation of banking laws:
Obviously the [OCC] has interpreted the Bank's
collection expenses and attorney's fees paid
on behalf of the Directors as "conditions
resulting" from the violation of 12 U.S.C. S
84.
The Directors argue that the collection
expenses are not a condition resulting from
the violation of the law: There is no evidence
that but for these loans being excessive they
would not have become delinquent. That
argument is meritless. If the Directors have
acted within the law, the excess loans would
never have been made, and the problem of
collection would never have arisen. 37
IV CONCLUSION
To a large degree, lending limit compliance is simple common
sense. Armed with knowledge of the statutory purposes of § 84 -
risk diversification and benefit spreading, the alert banker can
develop an intuitive awareness of lending limit concerns. However,
problems lay in wait among the intricacies of our increasingly
complex financial environment. Potential borrowers often do
business with several bankers within the same institution, and
those same borrowers are often associated with numerous and varied
entities which may each be involved with a different bank officer.
In the final analysis, the gathering and maintenance of accurate
borrower profiles is essential. The responsible officer must make
it normal business procedure to keep up-to-date records detailing:
* The name of each and every entity, be it partnership,
corporation or otherwise, in which a borrower is
involved;
" The extent and nature of the borrower's involvement with
the entities with which he is associated, both in
financial and management capacities;
* The business in which these entities are engaged;
* The degree to which borrowing entities are
interdependent;
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0 The name of each other shareholder (in closely held
corporations), partner, officer or director of such
entities;
* The amount of any loans outstanding to any such entities;
* The amount of any loans outstanding to any shareholders
(of closely held corporations), partners, officers or
directors of such entities;
* Whether the borrower's family has outstanding loans with
the institution and the extent to which such family
members are involved in such entities;
* The exact use to which the loan funds will be put;
0 The nature of the collateral securing the loan or
extension of credit including, where applicable, its
manner and date of valuation; and
* The source of repayment.
Through the use of such information, a bank officer can
minimize potential for engaging in violations of lending limits.
Further, if such a violation occurs, absent any aggravating
factors, the availability of the above records would substantially
assist in establishing the inadvertent nature of the violation and
the good faith of the institution. As a result, statutory
penalties may be effectively minimized.
